Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia, 2026 SCC 16

The Supreme Court recognized a new common law tort of intimate partner violence, allowing the appeal in part. The marriage was found to involve 16 years of physical assaults, psychological abuse, isolation, and financial control; the husband conceded liability under assault, battery, and IIED and the parties settled damages at $100,000, so the only live issue was the basis for liability. Writing for the majority, Kasirer J. held that existing torts are inadequate because they target bodily and psychological integrity, not the distinct wrong of coercive control and its harm to a partner’s dignity, autonomy, and equality, which the episodic, contact or imminence based torts of battery, assault, and IIED cannot capture.

The tort requires conduct arising in an intimate partnership or its aftermath, intended by the defendant (not necessarily intended to control), that on an objective measure constitutes coercive control; harm need not be proven separately, and the tort is tailored to exclude victims’ acts of resistance and ordinary dysfunction. Karakatsanis J. concurred but would have gone broader to cover any act or threat of violence causing harm, while Côté, Rowe, and Jamal JJ. dissented on the basis that existing torts already fully compensated the plaintiff, making this the wrong case to create a new tort.

K.M. v. Marson et al, 2018 ONSC 3493

In this case of historic sexual abuse, the plaintiff was sexually assaulted from 1978 to 1980 by his elementary school teacher. At the time of trial he was 51 years old. He led evidence that he suffered from serious mental health problems as a result of the abuse, including depression, PTSD, and anti-social behaviour. He had difficulty sustaining interdependent personal relationships and had difficulty maintaining employment. He was awarded damages in the total amount of $2,413,442.11 plus PJI.

T.I. v. Lakovic, 2016 ONSC 5750, aff’d 2017 ONCA 446

The female plaintiff was sexually abused by a taxi driver. She became intoxicated at a party and her friend called the defendant taxi company, which dispatched the driver to pick her up. The defendant taxi company successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that it should not be held vicariously liable for the intentionally tortious acts of the driver. Justice Broad found that the wrongful acts of the defendant driver were only coincidentally linked to the defendant taxi company’s activities as the operator of a taxi dispatching business. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the motions judge properly applied the law of vicarious liability and reached the correct conclusion on the record.