The claimant was in an accident in August 2016. He argued that the pre-June 1, 2016 definition of catastrophic impairment should apply to his claim because his policy had not renewed. Adjudicator Neilson disagreed with the claimant and held that section 2 of the SABS unambiguously stated that the new catastrophic impairment definition applied to the claimant’s claim.
The claimant was in an accident in August 2016. She argued that the pre-June 1, 2016 definition of catastrophic impairment should apply to her claim because her policy had not renewed. Adjudicator Neilson disagreed with the claimant and held that section 2 of the SABS unambiguously stated that the new catastrophic impairment definition applied to the claimant’s claim.
The claimant was involved in an accident in 1997. She applied for a catastrophic impairment determination in 2007, which found that she did not meet the definition. She did not dispute the determination. In 2016 she submitted a new OCF-19 seeking a catastrophic impairment determination and sought payment for assessments in that regard. The insurer argued that the claimant was not entitled to seek a catastrophic impairment determination and that it was not required to pay for assessments because the 10 year period had expired. Adjudicator Hines concluded that the claimant was permitted to submit a treatment plan for catastrophic assessments, and that such assessments could be payable because such assessments did not fall under the medical/rehabilitation limits. However, she also concluded that the procedure in the 2010 SABS applied rather than the 1996 SABS, meaning that the claimant’s entitlement to such assessments was limited to $2,000 per assessment and that rebuttal reports were not payable by the insurer. Finally, Adjudicator Hines concluded that the insurer was not required to pay for the claimed assessments because they were not reasonable and necessary. The evidence suggested that the claimant remained quite functional and did not demonstrate an ongoing functional limitation that had developed between 2007 and 2017.
The insurer sought reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision that the claimant had sustained a catastrophic impairment and was entitled to attendant care benefits. Associate Chair Jovanovic denied the request for reconsideration. He held that the adjudicator did not err in preferring the evidence and opinions of the claimant’s experts and treating physicians, and that it was not an error to accept an opinion of the claimant’s treating physician. In terms of attendant care benefits, the Associate Chair held that the claimant’s spouse could provide professional services without providing such services through an independent contracting company; he held that the spouse’s leave from work at the time of the accident did not prevent the spouse from acting as a professional service provider after the accident; and held that the verbal promise to pay the spouse was sufficient to meet the “incurred” definition. The Associate Chair also upheld the payment of attendant care for overnight supervision by the spouse.
The insurer sought reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision that the claimant had sustained a catastrophic impairment and was entitled to attendant care benefits. Associate Chair Jovanovic denied the request for reconsideration. He held that the adjudicator did not err in preferring the evidence and opinions of the claimant’s experts and treating physicians, and that it was not an error to accept an opinion of the claimant’s treating physician. In terms of attendant care benefits, the Associate Chair held that the claimant’s spouse could provide professional services without providing such services through an independent contracting company; he held that the spouse’s leave from work at the time of the accident did not prevent the spouse from acting as a professional service provider after the accident; and held that the verbal promise to pay the spouse was sufficient to meet the “incurred” definition. The Associate Chair also upheld the payment of attendant care for overnight supervision by the spouse.
The claimant sought a declaration that she sustained a catastrophic impairment, and sought entitlement to ACBs and medical benefits. The insurer denied all of the claims and argued that the claim for ACBs was time barred. Adjudicator Ferguson held that the claimant did not suffer a catastrophic impairment. He preferred the evidence of the IE assessors over that of the claimant’s assessors because the claimant’s assessors did not conduct any psychological testing, did not discuss the four areas of function, and did not explain how his scores for physical impairments were made. Adjudicator Ferguson held that the claim for ACBs was time barred and that the claimant only had two years from the date the insurer reduced her ACBs entitlement to apply to the LAT. The claims for medical benefits were dismissed because the claimant failed to provide evidence that they were reasonable for her injuries.
The Tribunal found that the claimant sustained a catastrophic impairment due to two marked impairments. The insurer sought reconsideration based on a number of arguments. Vice Chair Trojek rejected the reconsideration. She held that there was no requirements that the adjudicator convert the marked impairment into a WPI. She also wrote that the adjudicator considered the evidence before the Tribunal and arrived at reasonable conclusion based on the evidence. Finally, Vice Chair Trojek held that the Tribunal did consider the claimant’s credibility, and that the adjudicator’s view on credibility was not to be reweighed on reconsideration.
The insurer brought a motion arguing that the LAT could not adjudicate a catastrophic impairment dispute without some other benefits also being in dispute. Adjudicator Ferguson rejected the insurer’s position and held that the LAT does have jurisdiction to determine whether a claimant is catastrophically impaired regardless of any entitlement to benefits being disputed.
The insurer argued that the LAT did not have jurisdiction to determine if the claimant sustained a catastrophic injury because the claimant had not disputed entitlement to any substantive benefits. Adjudicator Ferguson dismissed the insurer’s motion. Adjudicator Ferguson held that the provisions of the Insurance Act and the SABS did not preclude the LAT from a determination of a catastrophic impairment on a stand-alone basis.
The claimant sought a catastrophic impairment on both mental or behavioural grounds as well as WPI. Adjudicator Paul Gosio reviewed the medical evidence and conducted a pre- and post-accident review of the claimant’s functionality, and determined that the claimant sustained a Class 4 marked impairment in the fields of activities of daily living, concentration, persistence and pace, as well as adaptation. However, since the claim was brought under an older version of the SABS, only one of the findings was necessary. Moreover, given the finding, Adjudicator Gosio did not conduct at whole person impairment analysis. The claimant was deemed catastrophically impaired.
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416.507.1850
© 2020 Thomas Gold Pettingill LLP