S.M. v. Certas Home and Auto Insurance Company

The claimant sought entitlement to medical benefits and removal from the MIG. The insurer argued that one of the treatment plans was barred by the limitation period, and should be dismissed. Adjudicator Norris agreed that one of the treatment plans could not be disputed because it was dispute more than two years after the denial. Turning to the medical evidence, the adjudicator concluded that the claimant suffered soft tissue injuries and that insufficient evidence of a psychological injury was placed before the Tribunal.

P.F. v. Aviva General Insurance Company (formerly RBC Insurance) (17-006863)

The claimant sought entitlement to IRBs. The insurer argued that the limitation period applied. Adjudicator Harmison concluded that the claimant was time-barred from seeking IRBs. She held that the insurer clearly told the claimant that he did not qualify for IRBs in its response to his OCF-1. The insurer also set out the two year time limit and procedure to dispute entitlement. Adjudicator Harmison further held that it was not the date of the OCF-3 submission that triggered the limitation period.

D.M. v. RBC Insurance (17-006781)

The claimant sought entitlement to an ADL assessment and orthopedic assessment. The insurer argued that the claimant was statute-barred from disputing the denials. Adjudicator Norris held that the claimant was not entitled to the ADL assessment, but was entitled to the cost of the orthopedic assessment plus interest. The claimant claimed to have not received denial letters from the insurer. The adjudicator held that the claimant was barred from adjudicating the ADL assessment as the claimant received an unequivocal denial on June 4, 2015, over 2 years before the LAT Application. However, the adjudicator held that there was no clear and unequivocal denial of the orthopedic assessment. The first “denial” letter noted that the insurer would not fund the treatment plan “at this time” and a second letter only referenced the assessment plans by HCAI number, which the adjudicator found made it too difficult for the claimant to determine which plans were in dispute. The claimant incurred the cost of the disputed orthopedic plan after the 10th business day after the plan was proposed and prior to receipt of a clear and unequivocal denial. The insurer argued that the claimant was barred per section 55 from adjudicating entitlement to the orthopedic assessment for failure to attend a section 44 IE. The adjudicator held that the claimant was not barred as the insurer requested an assessment more often than reasonably necessary. The claimant attended a section 44 orthopedic assessment, but the insurer had failed to have the assessor assess the claimant’s entitlement to the disputed orthopedic assessment. Adjudicator Norris held that it was unreasonable to subject the claimant to another in-person assessment so soon after the first assessment simply because the insurer failed to address the issue during the previous IE.

Tomec v. Economical Mutual Insurance Company (2018 ONSC 5664)

The claimant was declared catastrophically impaired seven years after the accident. The insurer had denied entitlement to further attendant care benefits and housekeeping expenses at the 104 week anniversary. The claimant sought entitlement to ACBs and HK expenses from the 104 week anniversary onwards following the catastrophic impairment designation. The insurer argued that the claims were barred by the limitation period. The Tribunal agreed with the insurer that the claims were time barred. On review, the Divisional Court upheld the Tribunal’s decision. It concluded that there was no doctrine of discoverability applicable to limitation periods, and that the time elapsed between the accident and the claimant’s deterioration did not affect the limitation analysis. The denials sent at the 104 week mark were clear and unequivocal, and effectively began the limitation clock.

Applicant v. North Blenheim Mutual Insurance Company (16-002606)

Following a reconsideration of the initial decision, the Tribunal was asked to decide whether the limitation period should be waived in accordance with section 7 of the LAT Act. Adjudicator Watt concluded that the limitation period should not be waived. He held that the claimant had failed to heed direction from the LAT that the 90 day grace period which had applied at FSCO did not apply at the LAT, the claimant’s delay caused additional preliminary issues, the insurer was prejudiced because it might be unable to locate, produce, or rely on old evidence, and the claimant did not provide any evidence of the merits of the appeal.

A.F. v. North Blenheim Mutual Insurance Company (16-002336)

Following a reconsideration of the initial decision, the Tribunal was asked to decide whether the limitation period should be waived in accordance with section 7 of the LAT Act. Adjudicator Watt concluded that the limitation period should not be waived. He held that the claimant had failed to heed direction from the LAT that the 90 day grace period which had applied at FSCO did not apply at the LAT, the claimant’s delay caused additional preliminary issues, the insurer was prejudiced because it might be unable to locate, produce, or rely on old evidence, and the claimant did not provide any evidence of the merits of the appeal.

A.F. v. North Blenheim Mutual Insurance Company (16-002336)

Following a reconsideration of the initial decision, the Tribunal was asked to decide whether the limitation period should be waived in accordance with section 7 of the LAT Act. Adjudicator Watt concluded that the limitation period should not be waived. He held that the claimant had failed to heed direction from the LAT that the 90 day grace period which had applied at FSCO did not apply at the LAT, the claimant’s delay caused additional preliminary issues, the insurer was prejudiced because it might be unable to locate, produce, or rely on old evidence, and the claimant did not provide any evidence of the merits of the appeal.

Applicant v. Aviva General Insurance (17-006831)

The claimant sought a determination that her impairments were outside of the MIG and entitlement to attendant care and medical benefits proposed in six treatment plans. Pursuant to s. 56 of the SABS, Adjudicator Watt found that the claimant was statute barred from seeking attendant care benefits as the benefits were denied more than two years before the LAT application was filed. The respondent’s letter advising that there was no entitlement to attendant care benefits as the claimant’s injuries were within the MIG was found to have started the limitations period clock. Adjudicator Watt also found that there was no evidence demonstrating attendant care benefits had been incurred or were reasonable and necessary. Adjudicator Watt found that the claimant’s injuries fell with the MIG and that none of the treatment plans in dispute were payable as the MIG limits had been exhausted.

A.F. v. North Blenheim Mutual Insurance Company (16-002336)

Following a reconsideration of the initial decision, the Tribunal was asked to decide whether the limitation period should be waived in accordance with section 7 of the LAT Act. Adjudicator Watt concluded that the limitation period should not be waived. He held that the claimant had failed to heed direction from the LAT that the 90 day grace period which had applied at FSCO did not apply at the LAT, the claimant’s delay caused additional preliminary issues, the insurer was prejudiced because it might be unable to locate, produce, or rely on old evidence, and the claimant did not provide any evidence of the merits of the appeal.

A.F. v. North Blenheim Mutual Insurance Company (16-002336)

Following a reconsideration of the initial decision, the Tribunal was asked to decide whether the limitation period should be waived in accordance with section 7 of the LAT Act. Adjudicator Watt concluded that the limitation period should not be waived. He held that the claimant had failed to heed direction from the LAT that the 90 day grace period which had applied at FSCO did not apply at the LAT, the claimant’s delay caused additional preliminary issues, the insurer was prejudiced because it might be unable to locate, produce, or rely on old evidence, and the claimant did not provide any evidence of the merits of the appeal.