M.I.A. v. Aviva General Insurance (19-000993)

The claimant disputed entitlement to eleven different treatment plans for various therapies, assessments and CAT assessments, interest and a special award. The claimant had a notable history of chronic pain in the lower back, a failed back surgery, migraines, and used a cane. The claimant argued that the treatments and assessments were reasonable and necessary as a result of the accident. The insurer argued that the claimant had failed to comply with a LAT Order to provide evidence that the disputed treatments were required as a result of the accident as opposed to his pre-existing conditions. Adjudicator Grant noted that a review of the evidence showed a long history of the claimant reporting pain to his practitioners, however, there was no mention of the subject accident and the claimant’s complaints appeared to be a continuation of his pre-accident chronic pain condition. Furthermore, Dr. Wilderman, the claimant’s chronic pain medicolegal expert, did not review pre-accident medical documentation detailing the claimant’s long history of chronic pain and a failed back surgery, but based his conclusions on the claimant’s self-reporting. Adjudicator Grant gave Dr. Wilderman’s report little weight compared to the IE assessors’ reports, who reviewed both pre-accident and post-accident records. Adjudicator Grant concluded that there was no evidence provided that would show any of the disputed benefits were reasonable and necessary as a result of the accident. The claimant’s dispute was dismissed in its entirety.

A.C.G. v. Aviva Insurance Company (19-004820)

The claimant sought entitlement to NEB, physiotherapy treatment, and a chronic pain assessment. Vice Chair McGee found that the claimant sustained an impairment that continuously prevented her from engaging in substantially all of the activities in which she ordinarily engaged before the accident. Vice Chair McGee assigned greater weight to the activities that the claimant identified as being important to her pre-accident life. Also, Vice Chair McGee placed considerable weight on the clinical notes and records of the claimant’s treating physician of many years which contained frequent notations of concern over the claimant’s inability to cope as a result of the accident. Further, the factors from Heath v. Economical made clear that a claimant who merely “goes through the motions” cannot be said to be “engaging in” an activity. The factual record showed a young woman “going through the motions” of caring for her children and herself in the face of incapacitating mental illness and persistent physical limitations. Therefore, the claimant was found to suffer a complete inability to carry on a normal life as a result of the accident and her accident-related incapacity was fundamentally psychological in nature. With respect to the disputed medical benefits, Vice Chair McGee held that the evidence did not demonstrate that the disputed treatment plans were reasonable and necessary. While there was evidence that the claimant found physical therapy helpful in providing temporary pain relief, there was no evidence as to her program in physical therapy, or how well her treatment goals were being met. Moreover, the claimant’s pain complaints in themselves did not warrant a diagnosis of chronic pain syndrome nor investigation by a chronic pain specialist.

P.W. v. Aviva Insurance Canada (18-000854)

Both the claimant and the insurer sought reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision which found that the claimant was not entitled to an income replacement benefit but was entitled to an examination expense for an attendant care assessment. Adjudicator Gosio dismissed the claimant’s request for reconsideration, but granted the insurer’s request for reconsideration by ordering that the issue of the attendant care assessment be reheard. The adjudicator’s finding with respect to the attendant care assessment was based on an argument that was not raised by either of the parties in their submissions (the applicability of section 25(1)4 of the SABS), and Adjudicator Gosio agreed that the obligation is on the claimant to make their own case, rather than the insurer having to disprove the claim. However, he noted that the appropriate remedy in this case was not to vary the decision as requested by the insurer, but rather to invite both parties to make submissions on the applicability of section 25(1)4 of the SABS.

M.G. v. Aviva General Insurance Company (19-003062)

The claimant applied to the LAT seeking entitlement to housekeeping and home maintenance expenses, the cost of a chronic pain assessment, and the cost of two OCF-3s. Adjudicator Farlam dismissed the claimant’s dispute. The claimant had purchased optional HK expenses in her policy. The insurer paid HK expenses for February 11, 2017 to April 12, 2017. There is no evidence that expense forms were submitted by the claimant for April 13, 2017 to March 16, 2018. In this hearing the claimant sought HK expenses of $904.00 for March 16, 2018 to February 5, 2019, a period some 13 to 24 months post-accident. Adjudicator Farlam noted that she preferred the evidence of the insurer’s OT, who was the only assessor to observe the claimant in her house and who assessed the claimant several months after the accident, and who concluded that the claimant was able to perform housekeeping duties. Adjudicator Farlam also preferred the evidence of the IE physiatrist who noted that the claimant suffered soft tissue injuries and did not suffer a substantial inability to perform her pre-accident housekeeping tasks. With respect to the disputed chronic pain assessment, Adjudicator Farlam relied on the surveillance obtained by the insurer which showed the claimant driving in inclement weather, brushing snow off her car, walking through a parking lot, and retrieving bags from her truck. Adjudicator Farlam also noted that the claimant’s s. 25 chronic pain report did not enumerate or address the application of the criteria for chronic pain in the AMA Guides and was therefore not persuasive. The adjudicator dismissed the claims for the cost of the two disability certificates as the insurer did not request the updated OCF-3s and there was no medical evidence to suggest they were required.

P.W. v. Aviva Insurance Canada (18-000854)

Both the claimant and the insurer sought reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision which found that the claimant was not entitled to an income replacement benefit but was entitled to an examination expense for an attendant care assessment. Adjudicator Gosio dismissed the claimant’s request for reconsideration, but granted the insurer’s request for reconsideration by ordering that the issue of the attendant care assessment be reheard. The adjudicator’s finding with respect to the attendant care assessment was based on an argument that was not raised by either of the parties in their submissions (the applicability of section 25(1)4 of the SABS), and Adjudicator Gosio agreed that the obligation is on the claimant to make their own case, rather than the insurer having to disprove the claim. However, he noted that the appropriate remedy in this case was not to vary the decision as requested by the insurer, but rather to invite both parties to make submissions on the applicability of section 25(1)4 of the SABS.

B.D. v Aviva General Insurance (18-010618)

The claimant asked for a reconsideration of part of the Tribunal’s decision regarding the denial of an orthopaedic assessment. Vice Chair Farlam was satisfied that the decision did not contain any errors of law or fact. Having accepted some of the evidence in the orthopaedic assessment did not obligate the adjudicator to find that the cost of it was reasonable and necessary. Vice Chair Farlam held that there was a distinction between finding that the claimant sustained the impairments in question apart from finding that proposed treatment was reasonable and necessary. The claimant’s suggestion that the orthopaedic assessment was a key part of the Decision which allowed three other treatment plans to be awarded, and that but for the orthopaedic assessment the decision would not have been reached, was speculation and did not establish ground for reconsideration. The claimant also argued that the adjudicator made a significant error of law or fact in failing to find that she was entitled to the cost of the orthopaedic assessment because she never received a denial notice from the insurer. However, the evidence before the Vice Chair was that the claimant did receive an appropriate denial and the date of denial of all treatment plans and examinations were agreed upon prior to the hearing. The claimant also suggested that a negative inference should be drawn against the insurer for not providing the accident benefits file and that the notice of examination was deficient. Vice Chair Farlam held that reconsideration was not an opportunity to raise new and different arguments not made at the hearing. The reconsideration was dismissed.

P.K. v. Coseco Insurance Company (19-004126)

The claimant sought entitlement to various medical benefits for physiotherapy services, representing the balances owing on several treatment plans approved by the insurer and invoiced some months after the services were incurred by the claimant. The insurer did not dispute the reasonableness and necessity of the disputed benefits, but rather that payment of the benefits would exceed the $50,000 policy cap in the SABS. Adjudicator Farlam held that the claimant was not entitled to the disputed treatment plans, noting that the $50,000 monetary limit is one prescribed by law. While there are exceptions for optional benefits and catastrophic impairment, neither exception applied in this matter.

H.C. v. Aviva Insurance Company of Canada (19-003063)

The claimant sought attendant care and medical benefits for chiropractic treatment and a psychological assessment plus interest. The insurer had paid various medical and rehab benefits as well as ACBs. It denied the ACBs after the 104 week mark as the claimant was not deemed catastrophically impaired. The insurer also denied the chiropractic treatment and psychological assessment based on IEs that determined they were not reasonable or necessary. The claimant argued that the insurer was required to resume payment of ACBs because she had made a catastrophic impairment application. In regard to ongoing ACBs, Adjudicator Boyce found while an OCF-19 had been submitted and CAT assessments had been scheduled, there was no dispute between the parties that the claimant had not yet been found catastrophically impaired and as submitted by the insurer, that issue was not before the Tribunal at this time. Adjudicator Boyce also found the insurer’s denial notice of ACBs clearly indicated the insurer’s position and since there was no dispute the claimant was not yet deemed catastrophically impaired, the exception under section 20(3) of the SABS was not triggered. It, therefore, followed that the claimant was not entitled to ongoing ACBs for the period in dispute that fell outside the two year mark by section 20(2) of the SABS. With respect to the disputed chiropractic treatment, Adjudicator Boyce agreed with the IE opinions based on the medical evidence. Adjudicator Boyce found the claimant did not satisfy her burden to show why another psychological assessment was reasonable and necessary or why the assessment was not a duplication of assessments already conducted in the same year and to date.

P.P. v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company (18-000957)

The claimant sought a catastrophic impairment based on a 55 percent impairment, IRBs, housekeeping expenses, and medical benefits. The insurer argued that the claimant’s impairment arose from an earlier workplace accident, and that he was not entitled to any of the claimed benefits or a catastrophic impairment designation. Adjudicator Flude agreed with the insurer and dismissed the claims. He held that the claimant failed to prove that the accident was the cause of his impairments. The primary issue related to tears in the shoulder. Adjudicator Flude held that that tears were a result of the workplace injury, and not the accident. Further, he found that the claimant’s experts wrongly attributed 18 percent WPI for potential future surgery, holding that the SABS did not permit speculative future impairment in the WPI calculation. He also concluded that the three percent WPI for medication was not proper to include because it related to medications for conditions unrelated to the accident. Without those percentages, the claimant’s total WPI was below 55 percent. Adjudicator Flude also concluded that the claimant was not entitled to IRBs because he was not working at the time of the accident. The housekeeping expenses were denied as well. Only after the accident did he re-start his carpentry business. Finally, the claimed medical benefits were denied because they related to treatment for the shoulder, and the claimant also failed to prove that the treatment was providing relief.

Pereira v. Aviva General Insurance Company (19-010861)

The claimant sought entitlement to two medical benefits for chiropractic treatment and interest. In addition to the two treatment plans that the parties agreed would be addressed in the written hearing, the claimant’s initial submissions addressed a number of new issues that were not contained in his application to the Tribunal, that were not raised or addressed at the case conference and were not confirmed in the Case Conference Order as being properly in dispute. The claimant also filed a Notice of Motion with the Tribunal seeking to add 15 additional issues or amendments to the written hearing, the bulk of which were those addressed in his initial submissions but were not captured by the Case Conference Order or addressed by the insurer in its response. Adjudicator Boyce noted that granting the claimant’s request to add additional issues at this stage in the proceeding would be procedurally and substantively unfair to the insurer and would not result in a fair and open process. Accordingly, the claimant’s motion was dismissed without prejudice, as these issues and sub-issues would require a fresh application in order to proceed properly and fairly and in order to afford the insurer the requisite amount of procedural fairness. With respect to the medical benefits, the claimant submitted that because he was not aware of the insurer’s denial of the treatments he incurred in this current dispute he continued to submit expenses via OCF-6 and not via the requested OCF-18 treatment plans. Adjudicator Boyce held that section 38(2) was triggered because the claimant incurred all of the chiropractic treatment prior to submission of the treatment plans in dispute. The adjudicator agreed that none of the section 38(2) exceptions applied to the claimant’s case and held that there was no issues with any of the insurer’s denial notices, with its adjusting of the claimant’s claims or its reliance on IEs.