The claimant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision that her claim for NEBs and medical benefits was barred by the limitation period. She argued that the Tribunal should have applied Tomec v. Economical to conclude that the claimant could not have discovered her claim until receiving an MRI result. Adjudicator Johal dismissed the reconsideration. He held that there was no error with respect to the doctrine of discoverability. The MRI report had no bearing on the claimant being aware of her need for treatment or her activities of normal life. He also noted that the insurer had not “pre-emptively denied” the claim for NEBs or physiotherapy as had occurred in Tomec.
Category: Medical Benefits
The claimant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision that her claim for NEBs and medical benefits was barred by the limitation period. She argued that the Tribunal should have applied Tomec v. Economical to conclude that the claimant could not have discovered her claim until receiving an MRI result. Adjudicator Johal dismissed the reconsideration. He held that there was no error with respect to the doctrine of discoverability. The MRI report had no bearing on the claimant being aware of her need for treatment or her activities of normal life. He also noted that the insurer had not “pre-emptively denied” the claim for NEBs or physiotherapy as had occurred in Tomec.
The claimant sought entitlement to a chronic pain assessment. Adjudicator Goela held that the assessment was not reasonable and necessary, and not payable. Additionally, she held that the treatment plan did not comply with section 38(3) as it was not signed by the claimant or the proposed assessor, nor did assessor provide information or opinion that the assessment was reasonable and necessary. On technical grounds alone, the treatment plan would not have been payable.
The claimant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision that her claim for NEBs and medical benefits was barred by the limitation period. She argued that the Tribunal should have applied Tomec v. Economical to conclude that the claimant could not have discovered her claim until receiving an MRI result. Adjudicator Johal dismissed the reconsideration. He held that there was no error with respect to the doctrine of discoverability. The MRI report had no bearing on the claimant being aware of her need for treatment or her activities of normal life. He also noted that the insurer had not “pre-emptively denied” the claim for NEBs or physiotherapy as had occurred in Tomec.
The claimant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision that her claim for NEBs and medical benefits was barred by the limitation period. She argued that the Tribunal should have applied Tomec v. Economical to conclude that the claimant could not have discovered her claim until receiving an MRI result. Adjudicator Johal dismissed the reconsideration. He held that there was no error with respect to the doctrine of discoverability. The MRI report had no bearing on the claimant being aware of her need for treatment or her activities of normal life. He also noted that the insurer had not “pre-emptively denied” the claim for NEBs or physiotherapy as had occurred in Tomec.
The claimant sought entitlement to NEBs and further physiotherapy treatment. Adjudicator Johal dismissed both claims. He held that the claimant failed to provide evidence of her pre-accident and post-accident activities, so the Tribunal could not consider what change was caused by the accident. He also noted that the claimant was on ODSP for 20 years prior to the accident for previous injuries and impairments. The claimant failed to address two earlier motor vehicle accidents and their effect on her normal life. The claim for further physiotherapy was also denied. The claimant did not provide any evidence from her family physician or treatment providers to support the goals of further passive therapy.
The claimant sought entitlement to two medical benefits for physiotherapy and occupational therapy services. The claimant had a significant pre-accident medical history that included a workplace accident, two separate motor vehicle accidents in 2013, chronic lumbar radiculopathy, and chronic lower back pain. He was also involved in a subsequent motor vehicle accident in 2016 after the subject accident. The insurer argued that the disputed treatment plans fail the test for causation. The claimant submitted the disputed treatment plans shortly after the 2016 accident. The insurer argued that the claimant ought to have commenced an accident benefits claim in relation to that loss. The claimant argued that the accident need not be the sole cause of the injuries in order to meet the “but for” test as established in Sabadash v. State Farm. Vice Chair McGee found that the subject accident met this threshold and deemed the two treatment plans to be reasonable and necessary. An issue was also raised as to whether the insurer satisfied the IE notice requirements in section 44(5) of the Schedule. The insurer sent IE notices to the claimant, but omitted crucial information as to the reasons for the sought examination. The notices simply stated “Rescheduled assessment” and “RESCHEDULED” as the reasons. Vice Chair McGee found that the insurer’s notice was patently deficient. Neither of the IE notices provided comprehensible “medical or other reasons” for the requested examinations. She reasoned that an insured person should not be expected to piece together “medical or other reasons” for an examination from disparate notices and correspondence or to advise an insurer of deficiencies in those notices so they may be corrected. Vice Chair McGee concluded that the appropriate remedy was the exclusion of the IE reports.
The claimant was seriously injured in a 2013 accident and sought a determination that he suffered a catastrophic impairment due to a combined WPI of 55 percent. He also sought entitlement to three treatment plans for further physiotherapy and psychotherapy. The claimant suffered from chronic pain and abused opioids as a result of his injuries. He also suffered cognitive issues from a traumatic brain injury. The claimant was unable to work as a result of these effects. Adjudicator Hines concluded that the claimant did not suffer a catastrophic impairment. There was agreement between the parties that the claimant’s physical injuries had a total WPI of 17 percent. The disagreement focused on the neuropsychological impairment, psychological impairment, and equivalent WPI. Adjudicator Hines accepted the claimant’s expert’s opinion that impairment existed under Table 2 of Chapter 4 (neurocognitive), but did not agree with applying the high end of the range (14 percent). She was critical of the executive summary physician applying the WPI rather than the claimant’s neuropsychologist. She accepted the evidence from the neuropsychologist’s expert testimony that she would have given a rating of 12 percent WPI. With regard to psychological impairment, the claimant was diagnosed with major depressive disorder, and somatic symptom disorder. None of the claimant’s assessors or the insurer’s assessors found any Class 4 Marked Impairments. Both assessors agreed that there were Class 3 Moderate Impairments in Activities of Daily Living, and Adaptation. The differences of opinion existed with regard to Social Functioning, and Concentration, Persistence, and Pace. Adjudicator Hines accepted the opinions of the claimant’s expert who rated him Class 3 Moderate Impairment in both of these spheres of function. In order to convert the rating into a WPI, the claimant’s expert argued that a range of 30 to 40 percent WPI was appropriate by using a GAF score of 45 to 50. The insurer’s expert, who found slightly lower impairment in the two disputed spheres of function, opined that the claimant’s GAF was 54 to 56, which he converted into 21 to 24 percent WPI. Adjudicator Hines was critical of the range provided by the claimant’s expert, and noted that despite no findings of Class 4 Marked Impairments, the WPI range was equivalent to such. She was again critical of the claimant’s psychologist leaving it to the executive summary physician to provide the WPI range. She concluded that the appropriate WPI was 29 percent, based on the insurer’s expert’s testimony that all four Class 3 Moderate Impairments would not exceed that number. The total WPI was 48 percent, which was insufficient to be deemed a catastrophic impairment. However, Adjudicator Hines did award all three claimed treatment plans based on the claimant’s ongoing impairments and the coping and relief the treatment provided. The adjudicator noted that the insurer was only responsible for payment on the treatment plans up to the remaining medical benefits limits of $50,000.
The claimant sought entitlement to NEBs, a medical benefit for physiotherapy services, interest on overdue payment of benefits, and an award. The claimant argued that she had partially resumed some activities post-accident but not at all. The claimant also argued that even though she had returned partially to her personal care, she experienced pain when performing these activities. Adjudicator Farlam found that the claimant was not entitled to an NEB for a number of reasons. The first was that the claimant’s self-reporting of her post-accident capabilities in the OCF-12 did not establish a complete inability to carry on a normal life as a result of the accident. The claimant indicated that she could “partially” do all of her pre-accident activities except washing floors, sewing, dancing and dance instructing. The Disability Certificate was given little weight given the lack of detail and explanation that the disability was temporary. The rest of the records put forward did not establish that the claimant was completely unable to carry on a normal life and only showed minor injuries. With respect to the disputed treatment plan, the claimant submitted that the treatment plan was reasonable and necessary to deal with her pain, help regain strength and improve her range of motion. The insurer argued that the treatment plan was not reasonable and necessary because the claimant, by having already received rehabilitation treatment, had achieved the plan’s proposed goals. Adjudicator Farlam found that the disputed treatment plan was reasonable and necessary, in part. The claimant had experienced enough improvement as a result of this treatment that it was reasonable and necessary to allow her treatment to be continued and the overall costs of achieving her goals was reasonable. However, Adjudicator Farlam agreed that the insurer was not required to pay for the assessment and two treatment sessions that were incurred before the plan was submitted.
The claimant disputed entitled to two treatment plans for physiotherapy and chiropractic services. The insurer disputed the claimant’s entitlement based upon IE reports, and argued that new evidence was submitted in the claimant’s reply submissions were prejudicial. The insurer, by way of motion, requested that the new evidence was improperly submitted and requested it be struck from the hearing record. Adjudicator Grant partially agreed with the insurer regarding the striking of evidence. Adjudicator Grant noted that the right of reply was limited, and reply arguments were not the place to make new arguments or submit new evidence. The paragraphs containing new evidence or arguments were struck, and the paragraphs containing new medical claims (i.e., chronic pain) were struck as well as they were not supported by any previous evidence or arguments. The claimant argued that he was unable to include the new arguments in his original submissions due to COVID 19. Adjudicator Grant did not accept this argument, noting that the claimant could have communicated his inability to meet the submission deadline to the parties to ensure action was taken, and noted that the insurer was prejudiced by the late filing and new evidence as it was unable to mount a defence to the same or reply in kind. Adjudicator Grant determined that the disputed treatment plan for physiotherapy services was reasonable and necessary as both the claimant’s expert report and the IE assessor had reached similar conclusions regarding his physical status. The treatment plan for chiropractic services was not reasonable or necessary as it recommended an exercise bike and home exercises, which did not require the direct supervision of a chiropractor.