The claimant sought entitlement to three treatment plans, costs of various examinations, and interest on overdue payments. The insurer denied the first two treatment plans as the claimant had not exhausted MIG limits, but had later removed the claimant from the MIG. The insurer denied the third plan for not being reasonable and necessary, as well as a proposed orthopaedic assessment. Adjudicator Norris determined that the claimant was entitled to partial payment of the third treatment plan, and the costs of an orthopaedic assessment, as they were reasonable and necessary based on the records from the family physician. He also granted the claimant interest on any overdue payments from the insurer. However, Adjudicator Norris upheld the denial of the first two treatment plans pursuant to section 38(5) of the SABS.
Category: Medical Benefits
The claimant sought medical benefits outside of the MIG and interest on the overdue payment of benefits. Adjudicator Ferguson held that the claimant’s injuries fell within the MIG and dismissed the claimant’s application. Adjudicator Ferguson relied on the claimant’s self-reporting to conclude that the claimant did not have a credible psychological injury arising from the accident. Adjudicator Ferguson noted that the claimant’s own words in examination were “powerful evidence” in determining whether the claimant’s claimed psychological issues were credible. Adjudicator Ferguson also concluded that the claimant had failed to prove that she suffered from chronic pain syndrome because her self-reports were contradictory and non-credible.
The claimant sought medical benefits for driver reintegration sessions and psychotherapy sessions, as well as travel expenses. Adjudicator Maedel held that the claimant failed to establish that the benefits sought were reasonable and necessary. Allstate had partially approved the OCF-18 in dispute for eight one-hour weekly driver reintegration sessions and six one-hour psychotherapy sessions, as recommended by an IE psychiatrist. The claimant sought benefits for two-hour weekly psychotherapy sessions and an increased hourly rate for a driving instructor. The adjudicator held that the claimant did not provide any evidence to demonstrate why two-hour psychotherapy sessions and an increased hourly rate for the driving instructor were reasonable and necessary. The adjudicator also held that the claimant did not provide evidence to establish that the transportation costs were reasonable and necessary, did not establish a link between his license suspension and the injuries sustained in the accident, and did not provide particulars of the travel expenses as per the Transportation Guideline.
The claimant sought entitlement to three treatment plans, and interest on overdue payments. The insurer brought a preliminary issue concerning whether the applicant was precluded from submitting evidence regarding the benefits in dispute; more specifically, the claimant had failed to submit two of the treatment plans to the Tribunal. Adjudicator Go determined that, it was in the interests of fairness to admit the treatment plans despite their late filing. Adjudicator Go further held that the claimant was not entitled to any of the medical benefits sought, or to interest.
The claimant disputed his MIG status; entitlement to a medical benefit for physiotherapy treatment; and interest on overdue payment of benefits. Adjudicator Norris rejected that the claimant suffered a psychological injury as a result of the accident, finding that the evidence of psychological injury relied upon by the claimant was inconsistent with the entire rest of the claimant’s medical record. Further, the claimant failed to adduce evidence sufficient to establish that a pre-existing finger fracture prohibited him from recovering within the MIG limit. Adjudicator Norris held that the claimant suffered a minor injury within the meaning of the Schedule and is subject to the MIG funding limit. Entitlement to the medical benefit in dispute was rejected as a result.
The claimant sought entitlement to a neurological assessment and driving evaluation assessment. The adjudicator dismissed the claim for a neurological assessment on the basis that the claimant did not submit any evidence as to why the proposed assessment was reasonable and necessary. The adjudicator also noted that the claimant did not submit any evidence to refute the findings of the IE neurologist, who concluded that the proposed assessment was not reasonable and necessary. With respect to the driving evaluation, the adjudicator concluded that the proposed assessment was partially payable. The adjudicator concluded that the proposed mental health counselling as part of the driving evaluation was duplicative, and therefore not payable. The adjudicator also concluded that the treatment provider’s mileage was not payable as it is not an expense payable under the Guidelines.
The applicant sought various medical benefits, as well as an award pursuant to section 10 of O. Reg 664. Adjudicator Truong held that the applicant was entitled to the balance of the treatment plan for a total body assessment and documentation, but was not entitled to medical benefits for physiotherapy. The adjudicator held that the diagnoses listed in the physiotherapy treatment plan were not accident related. The adjudicator also held that the applicant was entitled to an award in the amount of 50 percent of the amount payable plus interest due to: Aviva’s handling of the first treatment plan; Aviva specifically refusing to pay the fees for a progress report it approved; and not providing an updated notice with medical reasons for denying the total body assessment. Aviva had partially approved a treatment plan for documentation and two physiotherapy sessions, and further costs for a progress report as long as a copy would be provided to Aviva. The progress report was provided to Aviva, however, Aviva argued that the report was completed in contemplation of the second treatment plan in dispute. Adjudicator Truong held that it logically follows that a progress report would contemplate further treatment, and the approval letter was ambiguous about what a progress report should include. The adjudicator resolved the ambiguity in favour of the applicant. With respect to the total body assessment, Aviva argued that it was for the purpose of completing the treatment plan, and was subject to the $200 limit per the FSCO Guideline for the completion of an OCF-18. Adjudicator Truong held that no medical reasons were given for denying the total body assessment, thus Aviva was in non-compliance with subsection 38(8) and the assessment was payable pursuant to subsection 38(11).
The claimant sought removal from the MIG and entitlement to psychological and physical assessments and treatment. The claimant had a pre-accident medical history relevant for depression and anxiety stemming from infertility issues. Adjudicator Hines concluded that based on the medical records and the evidence of the s. 44 and s. 25 assessors, the claimant’s pre-existing depression and anxiety did not prevent her from reaching maximum medical recovery under the MIG. Adjudicator Hines noted that the claimant had not demonstrated that the accident worsened and/or exacerbated her depression and anxiety. Adjudicator Hines preferred the evidence of the IE assessor to that of Dr. Shaul, s. 25 assessor, as Dr. Shaul’s medical reports contained inconsistencies and because she found Dr. Shaul’s reports unreliable, as Dr. Shaul never actually met the claimant. Adjudicator Hines concluded that the claimant’s injuries fell within the MIG, the disputed psychological assessment and treatment was not payable, and the disputed physical treatment was payable only up to the amounts remaining in the MIG limits.
The claimant sustained serious injuries and required 24 hour care. She moved homes to receive care from her father. The claimant and insurer disputed how much money the claimant was entitled to for the cost of rent (as a rehabilitation benefit). The claimant argued that she was entitled to the full cost. The insurer argued that she was entitled to the current cost less the estimated cost of the housing she would have resided in but for the accident. Adjudicator Ferguson held that the claimant was entitled to the lesser amount for rent. He calculated the amount as the rent for the current house less the average monthly rent for a two bedroom apartment plus 50 percent of monthly utilities. He reasoned that the claimant’s pre-accident living situation should be recognized, and that to pay for the full rent would amount to a windfall.
The claimant sought a declaration that her injuries were not predominantly minor injuries to be treated within the MIG, as well as entitlement to medical benefits for treatment. Adjudicator Watt held that the claimant was not entitled to any of the relief sought. The applicant failed to adduce any medical evidence to indicate that her injuries fell outside of the MIG. The claimant also failed to adduce evidence to address the stated goals of the treatment plans at issue and how the plans would achieve those goals. As such, there was no evidence to show that the treatment plans were reasonable and necessary.