M.F.Z. v. Aviva Insurance Canada (16-000517)

The Tribunal had determined in both cases that the MIG did not apply because the insurer failed to comply with section 38(8) of the SABS. The insurer sought reconsideration. Executive Chair Lamoureux held that the Tribunal had not made a significant error in concluded that section 38(8), and that the insurer’s notice was deficient. She agreed that the insurer’s failure to properly follow section 38(8) in regard to one treatment plan prohibited the insurer from relying on the MIG for all future treatment plans. However, Executive Chair Lamoureux did reduce the quantum of the treatment plan payable to one of the claimants to the amount incurred between the insurer’s defective notice and the date the insurer sent the claimant a cured notice.

J.C.C. v. Aviva Insurance Company of Canada (16-000663)

The Tribunal had determined in both cases that the MIG did not apply because the insurer failed to comply with section 38(8) of the SABS. The insurer sought reconsideration. Executive Chair Lamoureux held that the Tribunal had not made a significant error in concluded that section 38(8), and that the insurer’s notice was deficient. She agreed that the insurer’s failure to properly follow section 38(8) in regard to one treatment plan prohibited the insurer from relying on the MIG for all future treatment plans. However, Executive Chair Lamoureux did reduce the quantum of the treatment plan payable to one of the claimants to the amount incurred between the insurer’s defective notice and the date the insurer sent the claimant a cured notice.

M.F.Z. v. Aviva Insurance Canada (16-000517)

The Tribunal had determined in both cases that the MIG did not apply because the insurer failed to comply with section 38(8) of the SABS. The insurer sought reconsideration. Executive Chair Lamoureux held that the Tribunal had not made a significant error in concluded that section 38(8), and that the insurer’s notice was deficient. She agreed that the insurer’s failure to properly follow section 38(8) in regard to one treatment plan prohibited the insurer from relying on the MIG for all future treatment plans. However, Executive Chair Lamoureux did reduce the quantum of the treatment plan payable to one of the claimants to the amount incurred between the insurer’s defective notice and the date the insurer sent the claimant a cured notice.

C.F. v. Aviva Insurance Canada (16-002373)

The claimant sought entitlement to a number of treatment plans. The insurer asserted a MIG position and noted one treatment plan to be limitations barred. Adjudicator Avvy Go noted the burden rested with the claimant and that the evidence tendered did not tie any specific impairment to the MVA. Moreover, the impairments were described as “mild or degenerative” in nature. The MIG was said to govern. The insurer noted that one treatment plan, while approved, lacked information requested under section 33 regarding a collateral benefits payer and as such was not payable until complied with. The claimant sought payment; however, Adjudicator Go noted the timing of the LAT application was beyond the 2 year period. The claimant was limitations barred from seeking payment.

V.C. v. RBC General Insurance Company (17-000081)

The claimant sought entitlement to a number of medical benefits. The insurer asserted a MIG position. Adjudicator Rupinder Hans considered the medical evidence and determined that the claimant had met the evidentiary burden that the injuries sustained fell outside of the MIG. The treatment plans in dispute were deemed reasonable and necessary and therefore payable. Interest was also deemed payable on all unpaid and incurred treatment.

P.I. v. Aviva Insurance Company (16-001320)

The claimant sought entitlement to further medical benefits and removal from the MIG. Adjudicator Sewrattan concluded that the claimant had not proven an ongoing psychological injury or physical injury that fell outside of the “minor injury” definition. There was also insufficient evidence submitted by the claimant to prove that injuries arising from an earlier motor vehicle accident would prevent maximal recovery under the $3,500 minor injury limits. Entitlement to the claimed medical benefits was denied.

P.J. v. Continental Casualty Insurance Company (16-004272)

The claimant sought entitlement to a number of treatment plans. The insurer asserted a MIG defense. On review of the evidence, Adjudicator Nicole Treksler ruled the claimant’s injuries, including chronic pain, were outside of the MIG. The treatment sought was deemed payable. The claimant also sought costs for the insurer failing to provide log notes as requested. Costs were denied as the claimant did not sufficiently substantiate the claim under Rule 19.1.

N.K. v. Unica Insurance Inc. (17-001473)

The claimant sought removal from the MIG and entitlement to medical benefits. Adjudicator Ferguson held that the claimant suffered a concussion and post-concussion syndrome, which were not minor injuries. The claimant was therefore removed from the MIG. The sought medical benefits were denied because the claimant and his treatment providers had not explained how the proposed treatment would address and treat the concussion and post-concussion injuries.

T.S. v. Aviva General Insurance (17-000835)

The primary issue in dispute was whether the claimant sustained a predominantly minor injury as a result of the accident. Adjudicator Ferguson rejected the claimant’s allegations of psychological injury. He also rejected the submission that the claimant’s chronic pain was not covered by the definition of “minor injury.” Adjudicator Ferguson accepted that the claimant did suffer chronic pain syndrome as a result of the accident. However, Adjudicator Ferguson concluded based on the medical evidence that the claimant’s chronic pain was a clinically associated sequelae of his minor injuries. He was therefore restricted to $3,500 in medical benefits. The claimed treatment plans were denied

Y.X.Y. v. The Personal Insurance Company (16-000438)

The primary issue in dispute was whether the claimant sustained a predominantly minor injury as a result of the accident. Adjudicator Neilsen explained that ongoing pain alone was insufficient to remove the claimant from the “minor injury” definition. Rather, she had to prove chronic pain syndrome. The ongoing pain had to be accompanied by some functional impairment. She wrote that a diagnosis of chronic pain without any discussion of the level of pain, its effect on the person’s function, or whether the pain is bearable without treatment will not meet the claimant’s burden to show that the chronic pain is more than mere sequelae of the “minor injury” sustained in the accident. The medical evidence submitted by the claimant was insufficient to prove a non-minor injury, and Adjudicator Neilsen held that the claimant’s pain was mere sequelae of the minor injury. Adjudicator Neilsen also rejected the allegations of psychological injury based on the inconsistencies in the medical report and the claimant’s self-reporting. The only benefit awarded was $215 for a psychological assessment, which is provided for in the Minor Injury Guideline.