The claimant submitted a LAT Application in August 2017 disputing attendant care benefits, among other benefits. The parties resolved the issues in dispute and entered into a partial settlement agreement. In 2018, the claimant filed a second LAT Application disputing entitlement to attendant care benefits. The insurer brought this preliminary issue hearing, arguing that the claimant was barred from pursuing his claim for attendant care benefits in this 2018 Application as a result of the release and partial settlement disclosure notice arising from the 2017 Application. The claimant argued that he did not settle his entitlement to attendant care benefits beyond two years from the date of the accident, and thus, the settlement following the 2017 Application did not preclude him from proceeding with the 2018 Application. Vice Chair Marzinotto did not accept the claimant’s argument, noting that the 2017 Application indicated that the claimant was claiming attendant care benefits on an “ongoing” basis and that the settlement documents clearly referred to “any and all claims for attendant care benefits from July 5, 2016 to date and ongoing”. As such, Vice Chair Marzinotto dismissed the application.
Category: Settlement
The claimant sought reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision that it could not adjudicate or enforce a purported full and final settlement. Vice Chair Hunter granted the reconsideration and held that the Tribunal did have a more robust jurisdiction under the Insurance Act than simply deciding entitlement to benefits. Whether an accident benefits settlement had been reached fell within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
The claimant sought to dispute various accident benefits; the insurer argued that the claimant had entered into a binding settlement. Adjudicator Watt concluded that the claimant had entered into a binding settlement. He held that the evidence was clear that the intentions of the parties was a full and final release of all benefits claimed rather than a partial settlement. He held that there was no evidence of a capacity issue. Finally, he wrote that the Tribunal did not have equitable jurisdiction to enforce rescission of the settlement had it been unconscionable.
Following a full and final settlement of the claim, the claimant sought further payment for a treatment plan that had been in dispute as part of the initial LAT application. She had not rescinded the settlement within the two day cooling off period. Vice Chair Flude concluded that the settlement amount included the payment of the disputed treatment plan, and that the claimant was not entitled to additional payment of that same treatment plan. He reviewed the language of the SDN and the Release, which made clear that the settlement was for all present and future accident benefits claims.
The claimant, represented by counsel, entered into a settlement agreement with respect to LAT applications for disputed entitlement to various benefits. The claimant executed a full and final release and a settlement disclosure notice, and the LAT was notified that the claimant was withdrawing his applications. The claimant subsequently informed the LAT that he wished to stop the settlement process and that he no longer wished for his legal counsel to represent him. He sought to have the settlement set aside on the basis that it was improvident as he was placed under duress and lacked capacity to understand and consider the settlement documents due to mental illness. Adjudicator Maedel held the claimant was statute barred from rescinding the settlement. The claimant failed to establish that he lacked mental capacity to enter into the settlement, or that he was placed under duress at the material time. The settlement was valid and the claimant failed to rescind it within the two business day cooling off period.
The insurer sought production of the settlement documents from an earlier accident the claimant was involved in. Adjudicator Neilson ordered the records produced. She held that it was relevant to the current dispute what the claimant was paid in her earlier claim, and how the benefits were allocated. She noted that there was no evidence that the earlier claim was settled as part of litigation, so no settlement privilege applied. However, even if settlement privilege had applied, she wrote that the public policy against double recovery or overcompensation would require the claimant to produce the settlement disclosure notice.
The claimant sought to enforce a purported settlement with the insurer. The insurer resisted the claim and asserted that a Settlement Disclosure Notice was not signed. On review of FSCO jurisprudence, Adjudicator Christopher Ferguson adopted the reasoning and determined that a SDN is necessary for a binding settlement. The claimant’s claim was dismissed.