The claimant appealed the LAT’s decision that he did not suffer a catastrophic impairment. The claimant argued that procedural fairness was denied because he did not know the insurer would argue that an intervening event was the cause of his impairments, and argued that the LAT applied the wrong causation test. The LAT dismissed the appeal. Regarding procedural fairness, the Court held that the claimant’s failure to object to the insurer’s arguments at any point during the original hearing prevented him from advancing this argument on appeal. Failure to object deprived the Court of the evidence necessary to establish how the LAT would have dealt with the concern. Regarding causation, the Court held the LAT applied the proper “but for” test. The material contribution test is only applicable where there are multiple tortfeasors and there is risk of tortfeasors escaping liability by pointing the finger at one another. That was not the case in this dispute where the claimant suffered a medical event weeks after the accident.
The insurer appealed the Tribunal’s decision that the claimant’s slip and fall on ice met the definition of accident. The claimant’s application included other disputes relating to accident benefits claims that were not yet decided. The Court held that the insurer’s appeal was premature as the accident definition decision was interlocutory. The Court wrote that it would have jurisdiction to hear the insurer’s appeal of that issue once the Tribunal had determined all issues in dispute.
The claimant appealed the Tribunal’s denial of IRBs and a special award, arguing that the decision lacked procedural fairness, reasonableness, and did not consider key evidence. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Tribunal provided the claimant with an opportunity to present his case, and holding that the Tribunal was not required to cite every document submitted by the claimant in its reasons.
The claimant appealed the LAT’s dismissal of his catastrophic impairment dispute, arguing that the Tribunal’s supplemental reasons contained in the reconsideration decision violated the principles of fairness. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the SPPA gave the Tribunal the power to make rules to reconsider its own decision, and that the reconsideration process gave the Tribunal the ability to dismiss, confirm, vary, or cancel any part of its original decision or order. The Tribunal’s procedure in the subject matter followed the reconsideration process contemplated by the SPPA and the Tribunal’s own rules. The Tribunal acted entirely within its own jurisdiction on the reconsideration.
The claimant sought a stay from Divisional Court of the LAT’s decision that the dispute would proceed in writing rather than orally. The Court rejected the stay, holding that there was not a serious issue, there was no irreparable harm if the stay was not granted, and the balance of convenience did not favour the claimant given the prematurity of the decision. The Court wrote that if, at the end of the Tribunal’s process, the claimant wished to dispute the fairness of the hearing, he could do so at that time.
The claimant appealed the Tribunal’s decision denying an adjournment of a scheduled hearing. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the denial of the adjournment was an interlocutory step from which no appeal was permitted. The Court also declined to grant a stay of the proceedings.
The claimant appealed and sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision to dismiss her application due to non-attendance at an IE. The Court dismissed the appeal and judicial review, holding that the Tribunal properly considered the SABS and the materials before it, and the result was a reasonable outcome available to the Tribunal under the SABS. The claimant failed to prove that she was not afforded procedural fairness in the hearing.
The claimant appealed the Tribunal’s decision dismissing her claim for IRBs. The Court dismissed the appeal holding that there was no extricable question of law. The Court also rejected the arguments that the Tribunal process lacked procedural fairness or that the Tribunal did not apply the correct test for causation.
The claimant had previously filed a LAT Application in 2018 disputing IRBs and several treatment plans. The Application proceeded to a hearing and was dismissed. The claimant did not request a reconsideration of the decision nor did she pursue an appeal. On July 9, 2021, the claimant filed a second LAT Application disputing IRBs, the MIG and several treatment plans. The insurer argued that the claimant’s application for benefits was barred due to res judicata based on her prior LAT Application regarding the same accident, which was previously dismissed at a hearing. The insurer noted that while the disputed treatment plans for the current Application had different dates on them, they were for the exact same services that were addressed in the prior Decision. The insurer argued that res judicata would prevent the claimant from bringing multiple claims for the same relief simply by changing the grounds (or date) on which the claim was made. The claimant argued that the treatments plans were in fact new issues, and that medical evidence showed she required updated treatments as she had yet to reach maximal medical recovery and required additional treatment. Adjudicator Kaur opined that res judicata had been met. A review of the medical records indicated no additional evidence that would warrant avoiding the application of res judicata, in fact, the new records indicated that the claimant had reached maximal medical recovery and that no further treatment was warranted. Adjudicator Kaur dismissed the Application.
The claimant appealed the Tribunal’s decision that he was not entitled to IRBs. The claimant argued that the Tribunal incorrectly applied the SABS, misinterpreted the IRB sections, misapprehended the evidence, and breached natural justice. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that there were no errors of law committed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal’s decision to deny IRBs flowed from the findings of fact made by the adjudicator. The findings of fact were permissible in light of the evidence before the Tribunal, and the Court would not reweigh the evidence. The application of the SABS and the IRB test to the findings of fact was an issue of mixed fact and law, which was not appealable. The claimant failed to raise any issues of law upon which a reversible error had been made.