Mais v. Aviva Insurance Canada (19-008068)

The claimant disputed his entitlement to NEBs. The insurer requested that the matter be dismissed due to the claimant’s failure to provide documents that had been ordered produced at the Case Conference, and for failure to make written submissions for the hearing. The preliminary motion was dismissed, but Adjudicator Farlam held that the claimant failed to prove entitlement to NEBs due to the lack of submissions.

Mann v. Aviva Insurance Company (19-007477)

The claimant sought entitlement to a psychological assessment and a chronic pain assessment, plus a special award. As a preliminary matter, the parties’ submissions refer to a disagreement over whether the psychological assessment was withdrawn with prejudice by the claimant at a previous case conference in an earlier Tribunal matter. Adjudicator Maleki-Yazdi found that the claimant could proceed with the dispute, as there was no final order from the Tribunal regarding the assessment. The claimant argued that the insurer’s denial did not comply with section 38(8), as the denial was not made within 10 business days. The insurer argued that the treatment plan was submitted to Aviva Insurance Company of Canada, a separate legal entity, and the documents were not received by the insurer nor did it have access. Furthermore, the insurer submitted that the claimant did not comply with section 38(2) because the claimant incurred the cost of the treatment plan less than 10 days after the submission. Adjudicator Maleki-Yazdi held that the evidence demonstrated that the assessment was incurred prior to the submission to the insurer and none of the exceptions listed in section 38(2) applied to the case. With respect to chronic pain assessment, Adjudicator Maleki-Yazdi held that there was evidence that, as a result of the accident, the claimant experienced an exacerbation of the constant and/or severe pain that she experienced prior to the accident. Considering how frequently the claimant visited with her family physician, the fact that there were no further assessments of either Chronic Pain Syndrome or chronic neck/back sprain during the months prior to the accident demonstrated that she was not experiencing constant and/or severe pain leading up to the date of loss. There was also evidence that the claimant experienced some functional limitations as a result of the physical pain. The chronic pain assessment was there found to be reasonable and necessary. The special award claim was dismissed.

Bhullar v. TD Insurance Meloche Monnex (19-010667)

The claimant sought entitlement to two treatment plans for chiropractic services, massage therapy, and physiotherapy. The insurer submitted that it was not liable to pay either treatment plan in dispute because neither were signed by the health care provider and the claimant as required by section 38(3). The claimant argued that the first time the insurer raised the issue of non-compliance with section 38(3) was in its written hearing submissions and the insurer’s denial letters did not raise the issue of the OCF-18s being unsigned. Adjudicator Lake found that if the insurer was not consenting to an unsigned copy of the OCF-18 being received through HCAI and wanted to view the executed hardcopy on file at the clinic, it was incumbent upon the insurer to request a copy of the OCF-18 upon receipt of the electronic version through HCAI. The insurer’s decision to first raise the issue in its written submissions was inappropriate. Adjudicator Lake found that further massage therapy was reasonable, but the remainder of the claims were not proven.

W.A. v. Aviva General Insurance (19-000287)

The claimant sought reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision denying his entitlement to income replacement benefits. Vice Chair Farlam dismissed the claimant’s reconsideration request, noting that reconsideration is only warranted in cases where an adjudicator has made a significant legal or evidentiary mistake preventing a just outcome, where false evidence has been admitted, or where genuinely new and undiscoverable evidence comes to light after a hearing. Vice Chair Farm reviewed the decision, and was satisfied that the totality of the medical evidence was considered and reasonable conclusions were reached based on the evidence as a whole, including credibility problems inherent in the evidence. Vice Chair Farlam also noted that all “new evidence” relied upon by the claimant on reconsideration existed and could have been obtained prior to the hearing.

B.D. v Aviva General Insurance (18-010618)

The claimant asked for a reconsideration of part of the Tribunal’s decision regarding the denial of an orthopaedic assessment. Vice Chair Farlam was satisfied that the decision did not contain any errors of law or fact. Having accepted some of the evidence in the orthopaedic assessment did not obligate the adjudicator to find that the cost of it was reasonable and necessary. Vice Chair Farlam held that there was a distinction between finding that the claimant sustained the impairments in question apart from finding that proposed treatment was reasonable and necessary. The claimant’s suggestion that the orthopaedic assessment was a key part of the Decision which allowed three other treatment plans to be awarded, and that but for the orthopaedic assessment the decision would not have been reached, was speculation and did not establish ground for reconsideration. The claimant also argued that the adjudicator made a significant error of law or fact in failing to find that she was entitled to the cost of the orthopaedic assessment because she never received a denial notice from the insurer. However, the evidence before the Vice Chair was that the claimant did receive an appropriate denial and the date of denial of all treatment plans and examinations were agreed upon prior to the hearing. The claimant also suggested that a negative inference should be drawn against the insurer for not providing the accident benefits file and that the notice of examination was deficient. Vice Chair Farlam held that reconsideration was not an opportunity to raise new and different arguments not made at the hearing. The reconsideration was dismissed.

W.A. v. Aviva General Insurance (19-000287)

The claimant sought reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision denying his entitlement to income replacement benefits. Vice Chair Farlam dismissed the claimant’s reconsideration request, noting that reconsideration is only warranted in cases where an adjudicator has made a significant legal or evidentiary mistake preventing a just outcome, where false evidence has been admitted, or where genuinely new and undiscoverable evidence comes to light after a hearing. Vice Chair Farm reviewed the decision, and was satisfied that the totality of the medical evidence was considered and reasonable conclusions were reached based on the evidence as a whole, including credibility problems inherent in the evidence. Vice Chair Farlam also noted that all “new evidence” relied upon by the claimant on reconsideration existed and could have been obtained prior to the hearing.

L.D. v. Gore Mutual Insurance Company (17-002762)

The claimant brought two motions: (1) that Vice-Chair Flude recuse himself from making a decision that he already made on May 27, 2020; and (2) that he then reconsider the same decision. Claimant’s counsel had previous requested that Vice-Chair Flude recuse himself, alleging bias stemming from a comment that was interpreted to be insensitive, for which Vice-Chair Flude apologized for. The claimant also alleged bias over a dismissed motion to compel, which Vice-Chair Flude found moot as the witness had answered the questions she was Ordered to on the day of her cross-examination. The insurer raised issues with the timing of the claimant’s recusal motion, noting that the impugned instances occurred in 2018, but it was not until the claimant received the first unfavorable decision and the motions were then brought some seven months later. The claimant further alleged that it was improper for Vice-Chair Flude to request submissions on costs as neither party had requested them. Vice-Chair Flude noted that the insurer’s materials filed on the motion to strike did request costs. Vice-Chair Flude denied both of the claimant’s requests and gave the claimant 14 days to submit pleadings regarding costs as the insurer had already filed its materials.

L.D. v. Gore Mutual Insurance Company (17-002762)

The claimant brought two motions: (1) that Vice-Chair Flude recuse himself from making a decision that he already made on May 27, 2020; and (2) that he then reconsider the same decision. Claimant’s counsel had previous requested that Vice-Chair Flude recuse himself, alleging bias stemming from a comment that was interpreted to be insensitive, for which Vice-Chair Flude apologized for. The claimant also alleged bias over a dismissed motion to compel, which Vice-Chair Flude found moot as the witness had answered the questions she was Ordered to on the day of her cross-examination. The insurer raised issues with the timing of the claimant’s recusal motion, noting that the impugned instances occurred in 2018, but it was not until the claimant received the first unfavorable decision and the motions were then brought some seven months later. The claimant further alleged that it was improper for Vice-Chair Flude to request submissions on costs as neither party had requested them. Vice-Chair Flude noted that the insurer’s materials filed on the motion to strike did request costs. Vice-Chair Flude denied both of the claimant’s requests and gave the claimant 14 days to submit pleadings regarding costs as the insurer had already filed its materials.

Pereira v. Aviva General Insurance Company (19-010861)

The claimant sought entitlement to two medical benefits for chiropractic treatment and interest. In addition to the two treatment plans that the parties agreed would be addressed in the written hearing, the claimant’s initial submissions addressed a number of new issues that were not contained in his application to the Tribunal, that were not raised or addressed at the case conference and were not confirmed in the Case Conference Order as being properly in dispute. The claimant also filed a Notice of Motion with the Tribunal seeking to add 15 additional issues or amendments to the written hearing, the bulk of which were those addressed in his initial submissions but were not captured by the Case Conference Order or addressed by the insurer in its response. Adjudicator Boyce noted that granting the claimant’s request to add additional issues at this stage in the proceeding would be procedurally and substantively unfair to the insurer and would not result in a fair and open process. Accordingly, the claimant’s motion was dismissed without prejudice, as these issues and sub-issues would require a fresh application in order to proceed properly and fairly and in order to afford the insurer the requisite amount of procedural fairness. With respect to the medical benefits, the claimant submitted that because he was not aware of the insurer’s denial of the treatments he incurred in this current dispute he continued to submit expenses via OCF-6 and not via the requested OCF-18 treatment plans. Adjudicator Boyce held that section 38(2) was triggered because the claimant incurred all of the chiropractic treatment prior to submission of the treatment plans in dispute. The adjudicator agreed that none of the section 38(2) exceptions applied to the claimant’s case and held that there was no issues with any of the insurer’s denial notices, with its adjusting of the claimant’s claims or its reliance on IEs.

H.M.L. v. Northbridge Personal Insurance Company (19-000375)

The claimant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision that she did not meet the post-104 week IRB test. The claimant argued that she received catastrophic impairment assessments that were not available at the time of the decision and which would change the Tribunal’s decision. Vice Chair Mather dismissed the reconsideration request. The claimant had received her section 25 catastrophic impairment assessments after the due date for written submissions, but before the Tribunal rendered a decision. Because the assessments were in the claimant’s possession before the Tribunal’s decision, she ought to have brought a motion to have the Tribunal consider the assessments. Vice Mather also held that the assessments were unlikely to have changed the Tribunal’s decision. The information and opinions in the assessments were contradicted by the surveillance of the claimant. The assessments also did not provide an opinion on the claimant’s ability to work in a suitable employment or self-employment, as they were only directed towards the catastrophic impairment test.