Jones v. Aviva Insurance Canada (19-013768)

The insurer requested reconsideration of a preliminary issue hearing in which the Tribunal found that the claimant’s application for a non-earner benefit was not barred pursuant to section 56 of the SABS. Vice Chair McGee dismissed the insurer’s request for reconsideration, on the basis that Rule 18 of the LAT Rules provides that the Tribunal will only reconsider a decision that finally disposes of an appeal. Vice Chair McGee noted that the preliminary issue decision was interlocutory in nature, and held that the Tribunal cannot grant reconsideration of an interlocutory order.

Nash v. Aviva General Insurance Company (19-010799)

The claimant sought entitlement to IRBs. The insurer brought a preliminary motion to strike evidence found in the claimant’s document brief, arguing that the evidence was hearsay of unproven allegations and irrelevant to the matters to be determined at the hearing. Adjudicator Farlam dismissed the insurer’s motion, stating that evidence is rarely excluded prior to a hearing by the Tribunal. Having heard no evidence from either the claimant or the witnesses, the Adjudicator was unable to determine whether the evidence would be relevant. With respect to IRBs, the adjudicator found that there was insufficient medical evidence to establish that the claimant suffered a substantial inability to complete the essential tasks of employment. There was no documentary evidence from either of the claimant’s pre-accident employers, post-accident employers, or the claimant’s union to suggest that he was substantially unable to perform the essential tasks of his employment, that he was let go for that reason, or that he resigned for that reason. The claim for IRBs was dismissed.

Rattan v. Aviva Insurance Company (19-006304)

The claimant applied to the LAT disputing his entitlement to three medical benefits and interest. The insurer argued that the doctrine of res judicata prevented the claimant from re-litigating his entitlement to two of the disputed benefits, which the LAT had dismissed in a previous decision. Adjudicator Grant agreed with the insurer that res judicata applied as entitlement to the two disputed treatment plans had been adjudicated on the merits and the claimant was attempting to re-litigate a final decision of the LAT. With respect to the third medical benefit, Adjudicator Grant dismissed the claim noting that he preferred the evidence of the IE orthopaedic surgeon to that of the claimant’s family physician with respect to whether further treatment was reasonable and necessary. Adjudicator Grant held that the family physician’s diagnosis was based solely on the claimant’s subjective reports whereas the IE orthopaedic surgeon completed a thorough physical examination and his objective findings were that the claimant did not suffer an impairment warranting further treatment.

Lin v. Aviva Insurance Canada (19-006064)

The claimant sought to IRBs and further chiropractic treatment. The insurer raised a preliminary issue that the claimant improperly relied on three exhibits that were not previously served on the insurer and sought to have them struck. Adjudicator Norris agreed holding that the claimant failed to submit evidence to prove that the documents were previously disclosed or to explain the failure to properly disclose them. With respect to IRBs, the insurer paid the benefit until May 27, 2018, when it concluded that the claimant no longer qualified. The adjudicator agreed with the insurer’s decision, stating that the claimant failed to provide evidence that any of her healthcare professionals recommended that she refrain from her pre-accident employment as a supermarket cashier. Finally, the adjudicator found that the treatment plan for chiropractic treatment was not reasonable and necessary because the family physician’s treatment recommendations were untimely and there were no treatment records showing how or if the claimant benefitted from the treatment. The claimant’s family physician made no clear recommendations for the claimant to continue with treatment during the period leading up to and around the submission of the treatment plan.

Mais v. Aviva Insurance Canada (19-008068)

The claimant disputed his entitlement to NEBs. The insurer requested that the matter be dismissed due to the claimant’s failure to provide documents that had been ordered produced at the Case Conference, and for failure to make written submissions for the hearing. The preliminary motion was dismissed, but Adjudicator Farlam held that the claimant failed to prove entitlement to NEBs due to the lack of submissions.

Mann v. Aviva Insurance Company (19-007477)

The claimant sought entitlement to a psychological assessment and a chronic pain assessment, plus a special award. As a preliminary matter, the parties’ submissions refer to a disagreement over whether the psychological assessment was withdrawn with prejudice by the claimant at a previous case conference in an earlier Tribunal matter. Adjudicator Maleki-Yazdi found that the claimant could proceed with the dispute, as there was no final order from the Tribunal regarding the assessment. The claimant argued that the insurer’s denial did not comply with section 38(8), as the denial was not made within 10 business days. The insurer argued that the treatment plan was submitted to Aviva Insurance Company of Canada, a separate legal entity, and the documents were not received by the insurer nor did it have access. Furthermore, the insurer submitted that the claimant did not comply with section 38(2) because the claimant incurred the cost of the treatment plan less than 10 days after the submission. Adjudicator Maleki-Yazdi held that the evidence demonstrated that the assessment was incurred prior to the submission to the insurer and none of the exceptions listed in section 38(2) applied to the case. With respect to chronic pain assessment, Adjudicator Maleki-Yazdi held that there was evidence that, as a result of the accident, the claimant experienced an exacerbation of the constant and/or severe pain that she experienced prior to the accident. Considering how frequently the claimant visited with her family physician, the fact that there were no further assessments of either Chronic Pain Syndrome or chronic neck/back sprain during the months prior to the accident demonstrated that she was not experiencing constant and/or severe pain leading up to the date of loss. There was also evidence that the claimant experienced some functional limitations as a result of the physical pain. The chronic pain assessment was there found to be reasonable and necessary. The special award claim was dismissed.

Bhullar v. TD Insurance Meloche Monnex (19-010667)

The claimant sought entitlement to two treatment plans for chiropractic services, massage therapy, and physiotherapy. The insurer submitted that it was not liable to pay either treatment plan in dispute because neither were signed by the health care provider and the claimant as required by section 38(3). The claimant argued that the first time the insurer raised the issue of non-compliance with section 38(3) was in its written hearing submissions and the insurer’s denial letters did not raise the issue of the OCF-18s being unsigned. Adjudicator Lake found that if the insurer was not consenting to an unsigned copy of the OCF-18 being received through HCAI and wanted to view the executed hardcopy on file at the clinic, it was incumbent upon the insurer to request a copy of the OCF-18 upon receipt of the electronic version through HCAI. The insurer’s decision to first raise the issue in its written submissions was inappropriate. Adjudicator Lake found that further massage therapy was reasonable, but the remainder of the claims were not proven.

W.A. v. Aviva General Insurance (19-000287)

The claimant sought reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision denying his entitlement to income replacement benefits. Vice Chair Farlam dismissed the claimant’s reconsideration request, noting that reconsideration is only warranted in cases where an adjudicator has made a significant legal or evidentiary mistake preventing a just outcome, where false evidence has been admitted, or where genuinely new and undiscoverable evidence comes to light after a hearing. Vice Chair Farm reviewed the decision, and was satisfied that the totality of the medical evidence was considered and reasonable conclusions were reached based on the evidence as a whole, including credibility problems inherent in the evidence. Vice Chair Farlam also noted that all “new evidence” relied upon by the claimant on reconsideration existed and could have been obtained prior to the hearing.

W.A. v. Aviva General Insurance (19-000287)

The claimant sought reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision denying his entitlement to income replacement benefits. Vice Chair Farlam dismissed the claimant’s reconsideration request, noting that reconsideration is only warranted in cases where an adjudicator has made a significant legal or evidentiary mistake preventing a just outcome, where false evidence has been admitted, or where genuinely new and undiscoverable evidence comes to light after a hearing. Vice Chair Farm reviewed the decision, and was satisfied that the totality of the medical evidence was considered and reasonable conclusions were reached based on the evidence as a whole, including credibility problems inherent in the evidence. Vice Chair Farlam also noted that all “new evidence” relied upon by the claimant on reconsideration existed and could have been obtained prior to the hearing.

B.D. v Aviva General Insurance (18-010618)

The claimant asked for a reconsideration of part of the Tribunal’s decision regarding the denial of an orthopaedic assessment. Vice Chair Farlam was satisfied that the decision did not contain any errors of law or fact. Having accepted some of the evidence in the orthopaedic assessment did not obligate the adjudicator to find that the cost of it was reasonable and necessary. Vice Chair Farlam held that there was a distinction between finding that the claimant sustained the impairments in question apart from finding that proposed treatment was reasonable and necessary. The claimant’s suggestion that the orthopaedic assessment was a key part of the Decision which allowed three other treatment plans to be awarded, and that but for the orthopaedic assessment the decision would not have been reached, was speculation and did not establish ground for reconsideration. The claimant also argued that the adjudicator made a significant error of law or fact in failing to find that she was entitled to the cost of the orthopaedic assessment because she never received a denial notice from the insurer. However, the evidence before the Vice Chair was that the claimant did receive an appropriate denial and the date of denial of all treatment plans and examinations were agreed upon prior to the hearing. The claimant also suggested that a negative inference should be drawn against the insurer for not providing the accident benefits file and that the notice of examination was deficient. Vice Chair Farlam held that reconsideration was not an opportunity to raise new and different arguments not made at the hearing. The reconsideration was dismissed.