L.D. v. Gore Mutual Insurance Company (17-002762)

The claimant brought two motions: (1) that Vice-Chair Flude recuse himself from making a decision that he already made on May 27, 2020; and (2) that he then reconsider the same decision. Claimant’s counsel had previous requested that Vice-Chair Flude recuse himself, alleging bias stemming from a comment that was interpreted to be insensitive, for which Vice-Chair Flude apologized for. The claimant also alleged bias over a dismissed motion to compel, which Vice-Chair Flude found moot as the witness had answered the questions she was Ordered to on the day of her cross-examination. The insurer raised issues with the timing of the claimant’s recusal motion, noting that the impugned instances occurred in 2018, but it was not until the claimant received the first unfavorable decision and the motions were then brought some seven months later. The claimant further alleged that it was improper for Vice-Chair Flude to request submissions on costs as neither party had requested them. Vice-Chair Flude noted that the insurer’s materials filed on the motion to strike did request costs. Vice-Chair Flude denied both of the claimant’s requests and gave the claimant 14 days to submit pleadings regarding costs as the insurer had already filed its materials.

L.D. v. Gore Mutual Insurance Company (17-002762)

The claimant brought two motions: (1) that Vice-Chair Flude recuse himself from making a decision that he already made on May 27, 2020; and (2) that he then reconsider the same decision. Claimant’s counsel had previous requested that Vice-Chair Flude recuse himself, alleging bias stemming from a comment that was interpreted to be insensitive, for which Vice-Chair Flude apologized for. The claimant also alleged bias over a dismissed motion to compel, which Vice-Chair Flude found moot as the witness had answered the questions she was Ordered to on the day of her cross-examination. The insurer raised issues with the timing of the claimant’s recusal motion, noting that the impugned instances occurred in 2018, but it was not until the claimant received the first unfavorable decision and the motions were then brought some seven months later. The claimant further alleged that it was improper for Vice-Chair Flude to request submissions on costs as neither party had requested them. Vice-Chair Flude noted that the insurer’s materials filed on the motion to strike did request costs. Vice-Chair Flude denied both of the claimant’s requests and gave the claimant 14 days to submit pleadings regarding costs as the insurer had already filed its materials.

Pereira v. Aviva General Insurance Company (19-010861)

The claimant sought entitlement to two medical benefits for chiropractic treatment and interest. In addition to the two treatment plans that the parties agreed would be addressed in the written hearing, the claimant’s initial submissions addressed a number of new issues that were not contained in his application to the Tribunal, that were not raised or addressed at the case conference and were not confirmed in the Case Conference Order as being properly in dispute. The claimant also filed a Notice of Motion with the Tribunal seeking to add 15 additional issues or amendments to the written hearing, the bulk of which were those addressed in his initial submissions but were not captured by the Case Conference Order or addressed by the insurer in its response. Adjudicator Boyce noted that granting the claimant’s request to add additional issues at this stage in the proceeding would be procedurally and substantively unfair to the insurer and would not result in a fair and open process. Accordingly, the claimant’s motion was dismissed without prejudice, as these issues and sub-issues would require a fresh application in order to proceed properly and fairly and in order to afford the insurer the requisite amount of procedural fairness. With respect to the medical benefits, the claimant submitted that because he was not aware of the insurer’s denial of the treatments he incurred in this current dispute he continued to submit expenses via OCF-6 and not via the requested OCF-18 treatment plans. Adjudicator Boyce held that section 38(2) was triggered because the claimant incurred all of the chiropractic treatment prior to submission of the treatment plans in dispute. The adjudicator agreed that none of the section 38(2) exceptions applied to the claimant’s case and held that there was no issues with any of the insurer’s denial notices, with its adjusting of the claimant’s claims or its reliance on IEs.

H.M.L. v. Northbridge Personal Insurance Company (19-000375)

The claimant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision that she did not meet the post-104 week IRB test. The claimant argued that she received catastrophic impairment assessments that were not available at the time of the decision and which would change the Tribunal’s decision. Vice Chair Mather dismissed the reconsideration request. The claimant had received her section 25 catastrophic impairment assessments after the due date for written submissions, but before the Tribunal rendered a decision. Because the assessments were in the claimant’s possession before the Tribunal’s decision, she ought to have brought a motion to have the Tribunal consider the assessments. Vice Mather also held that the assessments were unlikely to have changed the Tribunal’s decision. The information and opinions in the assessments were contradicted by the surveillance of the claimant. The assessments also did not provide an opinion on the claimant’s ability to work in a suitable employment or self-employment, as they were only directed towards the catastrophic impairment test.

H.M.L. v. Northbridge Personal Insurance Company (19-000375)

The claimant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision that she did not meet the post-104 week IRB test. The claimant argued that she received catastrophic impairment assessments that were not available at the time of the decision and which would change the Tribunal’s decision. Vice Chair Mather dismissed the reconsideration request. The claimant had received her section 25 catastrophic impairment assessments after the due date for written submissions, but before the Tribunal rendered a decision. Because the assessments were in the claimant’s possession before the Tribunal’s decision, she ought to have brought a motion to have the Tribunal consider the assessments. Vice Mather also held that the assessments were unlikely to have changed the Tribunal’s decision. The information and opinions in the assessments were contradicted by the surveillance of the claimant. The assessments also did not provide an opinion on the claimant’s ability to work in a suitable employment or self-employment, as they were only directed towards the catastrophic impairment test.

Salvi v. CUMIS General Insurance Company (19-005573)

The claimant sought entitlement to ACBs and various medical benefits for occupational therapy services, assistive devices, and chiropractic services. Adjudicator Paluch rejected the claim for ACBs and most of the medical benefits, but allowed the claims for assistive devices and one of the occupational therapy services. Regarding the ACBs claim, the claimant failed to prove that any services were incurred. The claimant’s affidavit submitted in support of the claim was vague and unhelpful as it did not provide specific details of services, times, duration, level of care, and no exhibits were provided from care providers detailing this information either. Adjudicator Paluch also questioned how the claimant could require 10 hours of supervisory care when the medical evidence was clear that the claimant could respond to an emergency independently. The adjudicator declined to deem the expenses incurred under section 3(8) as the claimant failed to advance any arguments, analysis, or evidence how the insurer unreasonably withheld or delayed payment, other than stating in a general way that the benefits were wrongfully denied. Adjudicator Paluch awarded the claim for a new mattress because there was evidence that the claimant had poor sleep as a result of her injuries and the new mattress did provide improved sleep. A portion of claimed occupational therapy sessions were also awarded because the insurer’s denial did not comply with section 38(8) (no medical reason was provided as to why the proposed treatment was “quite excessive”). Adjudicator Paluch was critical of the claimant’s failure to provide documentation as ordered in the Case Conference Order. Claimant’s counsel insisted on payment for records before production of same, despite the Order not requiring the insurer to pay for the records. Once the records were in the claimant’s possession, she should have provided them. Her failure to do so prevented the Tribunal from having the ability to review the complete clinical notes and records.

M.G. v. Echelon General Insurance Company (18-002005)

The claimant sought entitlement to a neuropsychological assessment, physiotherapy, occupational therapy, attendant care assessment, and assistive devices, a special award. As a preliminary matter, the claimant sought to exclude surveillance evidence and bar the insurer from cross-examining her on an affidavit from an earlier proceeding. Adjudicator Neilson allowed the insurer to cross-examine the claimant on the affidavit, as it was evidence and was relevant to the issues in dispute. The surveillance was permitted to be entered into evidence despite the insurer not producing the full unedited video because the insurer had attempted to obtain same and did not have the video in its possession. Adjudicator Neilson awarded the attendant care assessment, occupational therapy, and physiotherapy. However, mileage fees, transportation costs, and documentation support activities from the attendant care assessment were not payable. The neuropsychological assessment was denied as it was duplicative of an approved neuropsychological assessment, which the claimant had split into two portions to avoid the $2,000 cap on assessments. Adjudicator Neilson also granted a special award of 35 percent on the attendant care assessment. It had been denied when the claimant was in the MIG, and the insurer did not reconsider the denial after the claimant was removed from the MIG.

The Personal Insurance Co. v. Jia (2020 ONSC 6361)

The insurer appealed the LAT’s decision that counsel acting in a priority matter could not also act in the LAT dispute, and the decision excluding the transcript from the priority EUO from the LAT hearing. The Court dismissed the appeal and concluded that the LAT’s decision was reasonable. It held that a conflict could arise if the same counsel acted in the priority dispute and at the LAT. It also reasoned that the protections of section 33 would not be followed if the priority EUO transcript was admitted without leave of the Tribunal.

E.C. v. Northbridge Commercial Insurance Company (18-006384)

The claimant sought reconsideration of the Tribunal’s rejection of catastrophic impairment costs. Adjudicator Grant rejected the reconsideration request. He acknowledged two typos / misnomers, but neither affected the Tribunal’s decision. He maintained that the Tribunal applied the correct legal test, which required the claimant to prove that the disputed assessments were reasonable and necessary. The Tribunal considered the claimant’s physical and psychological conditions and determined that the claimant did not meet his onus. Adjudicator Grant rejected the argument that the Tribunal could not rely upon the content of medical records as it was hearsay. The Tribunal was permitted to accept hearsay and assess its weight. Second, the medical records were to be accepted as accurate unless the claimant called evidence to contradict the content. If the claimant wished to dispute the accuracy, he needed to summons the creator of the record to examine them at the hearing. Finally, Adjudicator Grant rejected the argument that he could not hear the reconsideration because he was the adjudicator hearing the original application. Jurisprudence was clear that a reconsideration is not a statutory right and that administrative tribunals are permitted to provide rules governing reconsideration the process, including who will hear the reconsideration.

B.M. v. Unica Insurance Inc. (19-009381)

The claimant sought entitlement to two medical benefits for physiotherapy and occupational therapy services. The claimant had a significant pre-accident medical history that included a workplace accident, two separate motor vehicle accidents in 2013, chronic lumbar radiculopathy, and chronic lower back pain. He was also involved in a subsequent motor vehicle accident in 2016 after the subject accident. The insurer argued that the disputed treatment plans fail the test for causation. The claimant submitted the disputed treatment plans shortly after the 2016 accident. The insurer argued that the claimant ought to have commenced an accident benefits claim in relation to that loss. The claimant argued that the accident need not be the sole cause of the injuries in order to meet the “but for” test as established in Sabadash v. State Farm. Vice Chair McGee found that the subject accident met this threshold and deemed the two treatment plans to be reasonable and necessary. An issue was also raised as to whether the insurer satisfied the IE notice requirements in section 44(5) of the Schedule. The insurer sent IE notices to the claimant, but omitted crucial information as to the reasons for the sought examination. The notices simply stated “Rescheduled assessment” and “RESCHEDULED” as the reasons. Vice Chair McGee found that the insurer’s notice was patently deficient. Neither of the IE notices provided comprehensible “medical or other reasons” for the requested examinations. She reasoned that an insured person should not be expected to piece together “medical or other reasons” for an examination from disparate notices and correspondence or to advise an insurer of deficiencies in those notices so they may be corrected. Vice Chair McGee concluded that the appropriate remedy was the exclusion of the IE reports.