Zakaria v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company (20-008398)

The claimant sought entitlement to NEBs and various medical benefits. The insurer raised a preliminary issue regarding the admissibility of the claimant’s chronic pain assessment, which was served two months after the production date set at the Case Conference. Adjudicator Kepman found the claimant’s chronic pain assessment inadmissible, as the claimant consented to the production date and prevented the insurer from commissioning its own assessment of the claimant. The insurer raised a further preliminary issue regarding the admissibility of the claimant’s affidavit. Adjudicator Kepman also found that the claimant’s affidavit was inadmissible, as the Case Conference Order specified that no affidavits would be submitted into evidence and the claimant failed to ask permission to include the affidavit as part of her written submissions. With respect to entitlement, Adjudicator Kepman determined that the claimant was not entitled to the occupational therapy assessment, physiotherapy, or NEBs. However, the claimant was entitled to the assistive devices treatment plan, in part because the insurer’s IE assessor did not comment directly on the appropriateness of the assistive devices in question.

Johnson v The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company (20-001056)

The claimant was involved in a motor vehicle accident and sought benefits pursuant to the SABS. On January 24, 2019, the claimant filed a LAT application to determine whether her injuries fell within the MIG as well as her entitlement to various treatment plans. On February 4, 2020, the claimant filed a second application which again included the issue of the MIG and entitlement to additional treatment plans. On June 9, 2020, Adjudicator Johal released the decision for the first LAT application, concluding that the claimant’s injuries fell within the MIG. The claimant did not request reconsideration nor did she pursue an appeal. Adjudicator Kaur found that the claimant’s second LAT application was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The claimant relied on additional assessment obtained after the first LAT hearing but failed to explain why this evidence was not available at the material time. Adjudicator Kaur noted that even if the reports were admissible, they were based heavily on the claimant’s self-reporting and lacked persuasive value.

Sharma v. Allstate Insurance (2022 ONSC 803)

The claimant appealed the Tribunal’s decision that she was barred from disputing NEBs due to the limitation period. She missed the limitation period by five days. The Court allowed the appeal, and ordered the Tribunal to rehear the preliminary limitation defence with a new adjudicator. The Court held that the Tribunal erred in three ways. First, the Tribunal improperly considered the length of the delay by considering the 735 days since the denial of NEBs rather than just the five day delay. Second, the Tribunal improperly analyzed the prejudice to the insurer by considering the prejudice that may have arisen during the entire 735 days since the denial of NEBs rather than the prejudice arising over the five day delay. Third, the Tribunal erred by excluding in reconsideration a new email from the claimant’s counsel to the insurer sent on the date the limitation period expired asking if the claimant had been paid NEBs.

Pereira v. Aviva (2022 ONSC 688)

The claimant appealed the Tribunal’s decision that he was not entitled to certain medical benefits because services were incurred prior to submission of a treatment plan, and that he could not add new claims for NEBs and a special award in his written submissions. The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal in its entirety. First, the Court held that the LAT was entitled to govern its own procedure, and there was no issue of law raised in the Tribunal’s refusal to allow additional issues in the original hearing. The claimant was free to commence a new LAT application for the new issues. Second, the Tribunal did not err in its application of section 38(2) which required the submission of a treatment plan prior to incurring a medical benefit. Further, the application of section 38(2) to the claim was one of mixed fact and law, which the Court did not have jurisdiction to interfere with.

Jarret v. Aviva Insurance Company of Canada (20-007746)

The claimant filed a motion seeking to add punitive damages as an additional issue in dispute to the LAT application. The insurer argued that the Tribunal had determined on numerous occasions that it did not have the power to order punitive damages. After considering the legislation, Adjudicator Mazerolle agreed with the insurer that it was well decided that the Tribunal did not have the authority to add punitive damages to an accident benefits claim. The claimant would not be prejudiced by this decision and was entitled to argue any allegations of bad faith through her application for a special award.

Pafco Insurance Company v. Sahadeo (2022 ONSC 328)

The insurer appealed the Tribunal’s preliminary order excluding surveillance at an upcoming hearing. Justice Corbett dismissed the appeal, holding that it was premature and an abuse of process. If the insurer is ultimately unsuccessful at the hearing and if it decides to appeal, it will be open to the insurer to raise the issue of the Tribunal’s exclusion of surveillance as a basis for appeal.

Mosa v. BelairDirect Insurance Company (21-011987)

The claimant brought a motion to: (1) compel the insurer to provide particulars clarifying a statement made by a claims representative in an email regarding a job site analysis; and (2) excluding the claims representative from representing the insurer before the Tribunal. Vice Chair Maedel dismissed both motions. Whether the claims representative stated something different in her email as compared to the job site analysis went to the issue in dispute before the Tribunal. The motion to exclude the claims representative was rendered moot because the insurer appointed counsel to deal with the matter. However, Vice Chair Maedel wrote that in future cases a claims representative could be excluded if he or she was not licensed with the Law Society if the Tribunal proceeding involved legal submissions.

Lockyear v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company (2022 ONSC 94)

The claimant appealed the Tribunal’s decision that he did not suffer a catastrophic impairment due to a GCS score less than 9. The primary grounds for appeal were the Tribunal’s refusal to admit video evidence of the accident and treatment by EMS, and the Tribunal’s decision to allow an IE expert to comment on matters outside of the written report. The Court held that the Tribunal breached the claimant’s right to procedural fairness on both grounds. First, the Tribunal ought to have allowed the video evidence to be submitted as it was relevant and could be probative of the claimant’s GCS score immediately after the accident. Second, the Tribunal ought to have allowed the claimant relief after the IE expert gave opinion evidence not contained in his written report. The Tribunal could have adjourned for a short period to allow counsel to prepare for cross-examination. The Tribunal also could have allowed the claimant to recall his own expert to give reply evidence. The Tribunal’s refusal to allow either was procedurally unfair to the claimant because it denied him an equal opportunity to address the new evidence. The matter was returned to the Tribunal for a new hearing before a new adjudicator.

Awada v. Allstate Insurance Company (2021 ONSC 8108)

The insurer appealed a production order made by the Tribunal in advance of ongoing proceedings. The Court dismissed the appeal as premature, holding there were no exceptional circumstances justifying appellate intervention by the Court. The insurer’s arguments were premised on the possibility of unfairness rather than any inevitable substantive unfairness, which could justify review of the orders. The Court wrote that the hearing adjudicator’s task included ensuring fairness to both sides as the case moved forward, and that an appeal would be available to the unsuccessful party at the end of the hearing if the party was not treated fairly.

Bagla v. TD Insurance Meloche Monnex (20-004158 and 20-004159)

The claimant sought reconsideration of a decision that his claims for ACBs were barred due to the limitation period. He made no submissions on the original decision because his counsel at the time unilaterally removed himself as counsel without notice. Four months after the decision was issued, the claimant retained new counsel, who filed a Notice of Motion to extend the time limit to seek reconsideration. Vice Chair Maedel granted the motion and extended the deadline to provide a Request for Reconsideration. The claimant was 74 years old and relied on his former counsel to file the written preliminary submissions. Vice Chair Maedel accepted that the claimant was unaware of the preliminary issue decision and the seriousness of the decision until he retained new counsel in July 2021. He also accepted that the claimant had bona fide intention to appeal the denial of benefits between February to July 2021. Vice Chair Maedel rejected the insurer’s argument that the motion should be dismissed because the claimant failed to show a bona fide intention to reconsider within the 21 day period prescribed by the Rules. He found that the Tribunal was mandated to ensure a fair process to permit effective participation by all parties and to ensure that decisions are based on the merits of the dispute as per Rule 3.1 (a). In this case, the claimant had provided no preliminary submissions through no fault of his own and a preliminary decision was rendered without his participation. Vice Chair Maedel indicated that other than a delay of the application between April and December 2021 as well as the cost of responding to the Request for Reconsideration, there was little prejudice to the insurer. Notwithstanding the extension of time granted to the claimant, Vice Chair Maedel indicated the claimant would be required to address the specific criteria for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 18.2 in seeking to reverse the Tribunal’s initial decision.