T.H. v. Allstate Insurance Company of Canada (19-004567)

The insurer sought reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision to award two treatment plans. The main argument for reconsideration was that the Tribunal considered an affidavit from the claimant that the insurer did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the claimant on. Adjudicator Paluch granted the reconsideration, holding that the Tribunal violated the rules of procedural fairness. The Tribunal had erred in considering the affidavit when it had been agreed by the claimant and the insurer prior to the written hearing, that the affidavit would not be part of the evidence before the Tribunal. The adjudicator had mistakenly believed that the insurer was consenting to the inclusion of the affidavit and that the insurer had waived its right to cross-examine the claimant on it

Chen v. Chubb Insurance Company of Canada (19-008582)

The claimant disputed her entitlement to NEBs, three medical benefits for treatment, and an attendant care assessment. Adjudicator Grant dismissed all of the claims. He found that the claimant was not prevented from engaging in substantially all of the activities in which she ordinarily had prior to the accident. The claimant had not provided a comparison of her pre- and post-accident activities, specifically on the amount of time spent on said activities, as well as the value and importance placed on each. The adjudicator also noted that the claimant had not provided any affidavits or oral evidence to speak to the Heath v Economical factors, and as such he only had the claimant’s assertions in the written submissions to rely on. Similarly, the claimant’s evidence did not support the need for further treatment, and the IE doctors had concluded that the claimant had reached maximum medical recovery. Finally, the attendant care assessment was not reasonable and necessary because the claimant had reported being independent with self-care.

Berisha v. Certas Home and Auto Insurance Company (19-012869)

The claimant sought entitlement to medical benefits and interest. The claimant had earlier been accepted as catastrophically impaired. The insurer disputed the overall costs of assessments, which it had partially approved. Vice Chair Boyce concluded the claimant was not entitled to any of the partially denied assessments. The claimant claimed entitlement to the assessor’s denied travel expenses for an in-home assessment. The insurer argued that pursuant to s.25(4) it was not liable to pay more than $2,000 for fees and expenses on any one assessment and the claimant bore the burden to prove the cost was reasonable and necessary. The claimant argued that she lived in a rural area, which justified the travel cost. Vice Chair Boyce agreed that the insurer was not obligated to pay for the provider’s travel expenses in addition to the $2,000 cap under s.25(5)(a), which was already included in the capped fee amount. No evidence was provided to show the provider was unwilling to travel if her travel expenses were not paid. The claimant also claimed entitlement to full payment for a neuropsychological CAT assessment. The insurer denied payment of the clinical file review claim in the amount of $2,000 based on s.25(5)(a) limit that includes a file review. The claimant submitted that the assessment had two components: psychological and neurological. The neurological assessment proposed was two separate assessments conducted by one assessor. Vice Chair Boyce agreed that the individual assessments were capped at $2,000 and the cost of the neuropsychological assessment at $5,500 more than the other assessments was not reasonable or necessary. The Tribunal had consistently found file reviews necessarily formed part of conducting an assessment and was not separate from the $2,000 payment. The claimant further claimed a remaining $2,000 for a neuropsychological assessment. The insurer again denied payment on the basis of s.25(5)(a) and argued that the claimant had attempted to skirt the s.25(5)(a) fee limit for assessments by intentionally separating the assessments into psychological and neuro-cognitive assessments to get two separate $2,000 payments. The OCF-18 provided the same descriptions and codes on the OCF-18 for both assessments. Vice Chair Boyce found the claimant had not demonstrated the reasonableness of the unapproved portion of the OCF-18.

Mohamud v. Certas Home and Auto Insurance Company (19-005153)

The claimant disputed entitlement to four treatment plans for various assessments and assistive devices, and a special award. The insurer raised a preliminary issue, claiming that the disputed dental assessment was barred by the limitation period. The insurer denied the plan on April 6, 2017, provided a clear and unequivocal denial and warned of the two-year limitation period. The claimant argued that the limitation clock did not begin until July 26, 2017, when the insurer sent a letter partially approving other dental procedures and noting that it “will not pay for any treatment that it had not authorized.” Adjudicator Lake ruled in the insurer’s favour, noting that the April 2017 denial was clear and provided notice of the two-year limitation. Furthermore, Adjudicator Lake noted that there was no power to extend the limitation period. Regarding the other treatment plans, the claimant requested to add additional evidence in the form of clinical notes and records. Adjudicator Lake denied the request, agreeing with the insurer that Orders should be followed. As there was no reason to why the late record could not have been produced earlier, the request was denied. Adjudicator Lake awarded the claimant part of a disputed OCF-18 for assistive devices and interest and dismissed the remainder of her claim.

Salim v. Aviva General Insurance (19-006944)

The claimant was involved in a serious accident. He was skateboarding and was hit by a vehicle and suffered nasal, left elbow, pelvic, and sacral fractures, and psychological injuries. The claimant applied to the LAT disputing entitlement to NEBs, ACBs, and the full cost of partially approved medical benefits. Adjudicator Farlam dismissed the claimant’s dispute in its entirety. With respect to NEBs, Adjudicator Farlam noted that the claimant travelled post-accident, resumed full-time education, and resumed his participation in sports including judo and wrestling. Adjudicator Farlam held that while the claimant required help with some self-care tasks and had ongoing physical and psychological limitations, he did not meet the NEBs disability test. With respect to ACBs, Adjudicator Farlam noted that the claimant reported that his family cared from him. However, the claimant did not submit proof of incurred expenses nor economic loss. Adjudicator Farlam noted that the claimant did not submit OCF-6s, receipts, invoices, or any other proof of incurred benefits. Adjudicator Farlam dismissed the claimant’s submissions that ACBs be “deemed incurred” as he did not believe that ACBs were reasonable and necessary in light of the 8 month delay in submitting a Form 1. With respect to the disputed medical benefits, Adjudicator Farlam opined that the claimant had not proven that the balance of the treatment plans were reasonable or necessary.

Halstead v. Aviva Insurance Company (19-01394)

The claimant sought a medical benefits in the amount of $12,341.56 proposing that the insurer pay the cash difference between her old vehicle, a 2016 Volkswagen Jetta, and a new vehicle, a 2017 Hyundai Tucson, which was a larger and more spacious SUV. The claimant and her treating OT argued that the new vehicle was necessary as the claimant’s job as a coffee shop newspaper producer and distributor required her to drive to over one hundred locations in the province over the course of two days every week to deliver papers. They noted that her old vehicle was smaller and lower to the ground which caused a strain on her hips while driving, made it more difficult to get in and out of the vehicle, and that the lower trunk height caused a strain on her back. The insurer denied the treatment plan on the grounds it was not reasonable or necessary as a result of the accident. The insurer noted in its denial letter that an IE would be arranged, but did not follow-up up on this and had no competing medical opinion. The claimant ended up purchasing the Hyundai. Vice-Chair Boyce noted that the claimant submitted two reports by the OT in support of the new vehicle, an original report from 2017, and an addendum report from 2020. Both the claimant and the OT took measures to find cheaper alternatives when selecting vehicles. Because the insurer did not arrange an IE, the claimant made the decision to purchase the Hyundai after a lengthy delay as it was necessary for her continued employment. Vice-Chair Boyce ruled in the claimant’s favour and found the medical benefits payable. A special award in the amount of $1,200.00 was also granted for the insurer’s withholding and delay.

Rattan v. Aviva Insurance Company (19-006304)

The claimant applied to the LAT disputing his entitlement to three medical benefits and interest. The insurer argued that the doctrine of res judicata prevented the claimant from re-litigating his entitlement to two of the disputed benefits, which the LAT had dismissed in a previous decision. Adjudicator Grant agreed with the insurer that res judicata applied as entitlement to the two disputed treatment plans had been adjudicated on the merits and the claimant was attempting to re-litigate a final decision of the LAT. With respect to the third medical benefit, Adjudicator Grant dismissed the claim noting that he preferred the evidence of the IE orthopaedic surgeon to that of the claimant’s family physician with respect to whether further treatment was reasonable and necessary. Adjudicator Grant held that the family physician’s diagnosis was based solely on the claimant’s subjective reports whereas the IE orthopaedic surgeon completed a thorough physical examination and his objective findings were that the claimant did not suffer an impairment warranting further treatment.

Nijjar v. Pembridge Insurance Company (19-011065)

The claimant disputed his entitlement to IRBs for an 18 month period and interest on medical benefits that had been resolved. Adjudicator Lake dismissed the claim for IRBs. She placed little weight on a “Physical Description of Job” sheet and a job description attached to an employer’s confirmation form that indicated a physically demanding job, because of contradictory findings. For example, the claimant had reported during IEs that his job was not heavy but required extended standing. The Adjudicator was unable to clearly determine the claimant’s job title or duties, and as such was unable to determine which job duties he was unable to perform. Interest was awarded on the two medical benefits from the date they were incurred. She dismissed the argument that interest should not be payable until the date that the claimant submitted requested medical records from his family doctor.

R.J. v. Certas Direct Insurance Company (19-009603)

The claimant sought payment for a housing accessibility assessment in excess of the $2,000 approved by the insurer, and sought a special award on cognitive training sessions that had been denied in 2017 but approved shortly before the hearing. Adjudicator Grant held that the $2,000 limit for assessments in section 25 applied to housing accessibility assessments, and that there was no carve out created by any Guidelines. He granted a special award of $200 on the cognitive training because the insurer had approved it shortly before the hearing, and had approved a similar treatment plan only months after denial of the subject treatment plan. The insurer had not set out a clear rationale for refusing the denied fees in the first place, and its approval of similar fees a few months later suggested that the fees were reasonable and necessary.

Z.K. v. Allstate Insurance Company Canada (17-006929)

The claimant sought entitlement to a catastrophic impairment designation, further chiropractic treatment, and the cost of denied neuropsychological and triage CAT assessments. Adjudicator Johal accepted that the claimant suffered three Class 4 marked impairments in each of activities of daily living; concentration, persistence, and pace; and adaptation in work or work-like settings. Prior to the accident the claimant ran a business for about twelve years, and became a licenced mortgage agent two years before the accident. He was very outgoing and social, hosted parties, and visited friends. He was healthy both physically and mentally and had no pre-accident conditions. After the accident, which was relatively minor, the claimant developed back and neck pain, and headaches. His mental functioning declined. He lost over 30 pounds, had no appetite, had poor short term memory, and needed assistance with basic personal care tasks. The claimant’s family believed he was depressed, and he reported being in frequent pain. He no longer entertained or visited friends. He did not return to work, and he rarely drove. The claimant’s neuropsychological assessor diagnosed the claimant with a severe pain disorder and moderate depressive disorder. She concluded that the claimant suffered Class 4 marked impairments in the above-noted spheres. The claimant’s psychological assessor made similar conclusions and conducted various testing to rule out malingering and feigning. Adjudicator Johal preferred the evidence of the claimant’s assessors over the IE assessors, who approached their role as a “detective” rather than neuropsychologist. The IE assessor also used testing methods that were not well peer-reviewed or had no validity measures. Adjudicator Johal denied the disputed chiropractic treatment because it was completed by a chiropractor, but largely proposed counselling and educational services, which were outside of the chiropractor’s scope of practice. The neuropsychological CAT assessment was approved, despite no evidence of head injury. Adjudicator Johal wrote that the request for an assessment was to show that there is a reasonable possibility that the claimant has the condition that is being investigated. The claimant did not need to show or prove that he had the condition in order for an assessment to be deemed reasonable and necessary. Finally, the triage CAT assessment was denied as there was no evidence presented why it would be required and what assessment of the claimant it would provide.