A.G. v. Allstate Insurance Company of Canada (19-003687)

A preliminary issue hearing was held to determine whether the claimant was barred from proceeding with appealing a claim for neurological assessment that was denied because the claimant was past the two year limitation period. The claimant relied on section 7 of the LAT Act to allow for an extension of time to file an application. Vice-Chair Flude considered the justice of the case in order to determine whether an extension of time following the two year limitation period was applicable. He looked to the four factors that applied in the justice of the case: (1) an intention to appeal within the appeal period (2) the length of the delay (3) prejudice to the other party and (4) the merits of the case. The claimant did not make any submissions on an intention to appeal within the appeal period or on the length of the delay and the explanation for it. Vice-Chair Flude found those omissions to be detrimental to the claimant’s request for an extension of time because it did not allow the Vice-Chair to understand the circumstances and to determine if reasonable grounds existed. It was Vice-Chair Flude’s view that the Legislature set a two year limitation period and also gave the Tribunal the discretion to consider if any reasonable grounds to extend the limitation period. However, it was the Legislature’s intention that the discretion in section 7 of the LAT Act was to be available only in exceptional circumstances where it would be unjust to deny a claimant a remedy. In this case, the claimant did not establish anything exceptional about it and had not justified the missed limitation period. For that reason, the Vice-Chair declined to exercise any discretion in section 7. In regard to the substantive issues in dispute claiming entitlement to medical benefits for two physiotherapy treatment plans and interest, Vice-Chair Flude found the claimant failed to show the treatment plans were reasonable and necessary. The records from the extensive physiotherapy treatment showed no change in her condition as a result of the treatment. The Vice-Chair found it would be unreasonable to continue with treatment with no benefit and accepted the argument of the insurer’s assessors that further facility-based treatment would be of no medical value, instead recommending a self-directed home exercise program.

Rohile v. Intact Insurance Company (19-009857)

The claimant disputed his entitlement to a partially approved OCF-18 for psychological treatment. The only issue between the parties was the hourly rate for the service provider for the psychological services. The insurer approved the treatment plan at the rate of $99.75 per hour. The claimant argued that the service provider, who was a social worker, should be paid at the same rate as a psychologist ($149.61 as per the Professional Service Guidelines). The insurer disagreed, as the service provider did not have the experience or specialized training in psychotherapy or cognitive behavioural therapy and did not administer same to the claimant. Adjudicator Watt noted that social workers can provide psychotherapy services, and that psychotherapists may be paid at the psychologist rate in certain situations – for example, where the psychotherapist has a high level of experience/education or where the psychotherapist charges a rate in their non-MVA related practice that is the same or higher than the rate applicable psychologists in the Guideline. However, Adjudicator Watt found that the rate approved by the insurer was appropriate and reasonable, as he was provided with no evidence as to the qualifications of the service provider nor what hourly rate she charged in private practice.

Ramlal v. Aviva General Insurance (19-011325)

The claimant sought to be removed from the MIG and sought entitlement to three treatment plans and the cost of an orthopaedic assessment. Adjudicator Hines concluded that the claimant sustained a minor injury, but was entitled to payment for the disputed treatment plans if they had been incurred prior to receiving proper notice from the insurer denying the benefits. Adjudicator Hines found that the insurer failed to provide adequate medical and other reasons for denying the treatment plans because the insurer’s denial of the treatment plans failed to refer to the claimant’s medical condition. Further, the notices did not state that the MIG applied, which is mandatory under section 38(9). In addition, the insurer failed to reference any medical records that it had received or to request additional medical records. Finally, Adjudicator Hines agreed with the arbitrator’s interpretation in Ferawana v. State Farm, that whether the treatment plans are reasonable and necessary is irrelevant to whether the mandatory payment consequence of section 38(11)(2) applies. Adjudicator Hines also agreed that nothing in the Schedule relieves an insurer of its liability from the mandatory payment provision on the basis that a treatment plan is not reasonable and necessary.

Sookram v. Zenith Insurance Company (19-012732)

The claimant sought entitlement to NEBs, and seven medical benefits for various treatment and assessments. Adjudicator Watt dismissed all of the claims, holding that the claimant failed to prove entitlement. With regard to the NEB claim, Adjudicator Watt also noted that the claimant was employed at the time of the accident, and that he did not satisfy the element of the NEB test that required that he “”not qualify for an income replacement benefit””. The adjudicator wrote that the applicant should have proceeded with an IRB claim instead. He acknowledged the Court of Appeal’s reasons in Galdamez v Allstate, but wrote that the decision allowing employed persons to claim NEBs was limited to applicants whose job duties did not include mobility requirements, and where the job was not of great importance to the applicant’s pre-accident life.

Walcott v. Aviva General Insurance (19-007910)

The claimant sought entitlement to three treatment plans for chiropractic services, one treatment plan for psychological services, and a catastrophic impairment assessment. Adjudicator Grieves noted that given the time elapsed before the claimant reported any accident-related complaints, and that there were only three entries relating to the accident despite seeing her family physician very frequently, the lack of objective evidence of ongoing injuries, and no recommendation from the neurologist, the claimant had not met her burden of proof. Therefore, the claimant was not entitled to the chiropractic services. With regards to the psychological services, the claimant’s family physician made referrals for psychotherapy, she was engaging in treatment which had been helpful, and the insurer’s assessors concluded that she met the criteria for an adjustment disorder with depressed mood and anxiety. Adjudicator Grieves concluded that the proposed treatment and associated cost were reasonable and necessary. Further, a treatment plan was submitted proposing various catastrophic assessments. The claimant relied on a report stating that the claimant’s psychosocial sequelae were causing challenges and disruptions to her life and normal activities such as being an effective spouse, mother and preventing her from returning to work. The claimant also submitted that there was a reasonable possibility that she was catastrophically impaired because her serious psychiatric conditions prevented her from returning to work or care for her children. Adjudicator Grieves found that the catastrophic assessments were partially reasonable and necessary. Adjudicator Grieves agreed that the claimant sustained serious psychological issues as a result of the accident, however, she had not established why each component of the multidisciplinary assessment was reasonable and necessary. A total of $8,400 of the claimed $16,272 was approved.

Verschuren v. the Personal Insurance Company (20-003677)

The claimant was involved in a serios motorcycle accident and was determined to be catastrophically impaired by the insurer. The claimant submitted a treatment plan for a home modification assessment by Adapt-Able Design in the amount of $9,217.40. The insurer partially approved the assessment in the amount of $2,200. The claimant applied to the LAT seeking entitlement to the denied portion of the treatment plan. Adjudicator Boyce was persuaded by the reasoning in previous LAT decisions with similar facts, and found that the insurer was not obligated to pay more than $2,000 for the proposed assessment, pursuant to section 25(5)(a). The claimant was not entitled to the unapproved portion of the treatment plan.

Syrovy v. Aviva Insurance Company (19-012498)

The claimant applied to the LAT seeking entitlement to a treatment plan for physiotherapy and sought a special award. Adjudicator Boyce found the claimant was entitled to the treatment plan, plus interest, and given a special award in the amount of $250.00. Adjudicator Boyce found that the insurer’s denial letter did not comply with section 38(8), as the insurer did not provide adequate medical reasons for its denial. In particular, the insurer noted in its letter that there was “”no compelling evidence”” to support treatment, however, the insurer had medical documentation in its possession where medical professionals recommended the precise treatment in dispute. Adjudicator Boyce found that per section 38(11), the treatment plan was payable. Adjudicator Boyce also found that the insurer unreasonably withheld the payments as it did not provide a proper denial. Adjudicator Boyce awarded a special award in the amount of $250 representing approximately 10 percent the cost of the disputed treatment plan.

White v. Travelers Insurance (19-010567)

The claimant disputed her entitlement to two treatment plans for vision-related services. The insurer denied the treatment plans on the basis that the claimant’s vision impairments were not caused by the accident, as the claimant had pre-existing issues with her vision and the neuro-optometry IE assessor found that the claimant’s visual impairments were natural history issues, unrelated to the accident, and should be improvable with a new eyeglasses prescription. Adjudicator Farlam rejected the insurer’s argument, and accepted that the claimant’s vision impairments were caused or exacerbated by the accident, preferring the records of the claimant’s treatment providers over the findings of the insurer’s IE assessor. On that basis, Adjudicator Farlam determined that the disputed treatment plans were reasonable and necessary.

N.C. v. Aviva General Insurance Company (19-004666)

The claimant sought reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision dismissing entitlement to medical benefits. Adjudicator McGee noted that the claimant filed her reconsideration submissions nearly a month after the deadline for submissions. Vice Chair McGee did not make any findings on procedural issues for the late findings, as she dismissed the reconsideration application on its merits. With regard to the claimed medical benefits, Vice Chair McGee held that the Tribunal applied the proper “”reasonable and necessary”” test in concluding that the claimant had reached maximum medical recovery and that no further facility based treatment was warranted. Vice Chair McGee also rejected the claimant’s arguments regarding the claimed MRI being available through OHIP. She reiterated that pursuant to section 47(2), the insurer was not required to pay for the MRI because it was reasonable available through OHIP.

N.P. v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company (18-010628)

The claimant filed a request for reconsideration of Adjudicator Norris’ decision that found the claimant was entitled to a physiotherapy treatment plan but not entitled to a chiropractic treatment plan, nor a second physiotherapy treatment plan. The claimant submitted that Adjudicator Norris made a significant error of law and that he misinterpreted section 38(11). Adjudicator Norris found that the insurer’s notice in response to the physiotherapy plan that was found to be not reasonable and necessary, failed to comply with section 38(8). As a result of that failure, Adjudicator Norris determined that the claimant was entitled to the goods and services related to that treatment plan which were incurred during the period starting on the 11th business day following the submission of the treatment plan. However, there was no evidence to show that the claimant incurred any goods or services on the 11th business day or any day thereafter. Thus, the claimant was not entitled to any payment. The claimant submitted that the insurer’s failure to comply with section 38(11) entitled him to all the goods and services described in the treatment plan that related to the period starting on the 11th business day, regardless of whether the goods and services were incurred. Further, the claimant relied on the principle set out in Rizzo and Rizzo Shoes Ltd. and submitted that the phrase “described” in section 38(11) did not require the claimant to incur the goods and services. The claimant argued that different language would have been used had there been a requirement to incur the goods and services. Adjudicator Norris opined that section 38(11)(2) served as an exception to the reasonable and necessary test, but only to compel timely responses from insurers. Moreover, section 38(15) directs insurers to make timely payment to service providers for the goods and services the insurer previously agreed to pay for. The latter part of the section addresses incurred goods and services the insurer was obligated to pay for as a result of an untimely or insufficient response. Lastly, Adjudicator Norris found that the claimant’s position led to an absurd result. The result was that a potential service provider receives a financial windfall from an insurer’s failure to comply with the time constraints of the Schedule, and the insured would be left without treatment. In conclusion, Adjudicator Norris found no error of law in the decision and dismissed the claimant’s reconsideration request.