S.P. v. Aviva General Insurance Company (18-008876)

The claimant sought reconsideration of a LAT dispute denying her entitlement to IRBs and medical benefits. The claimant was represented by counsel at the hearing and with respect to the reconsideration application. Adjudicator Boyce noted that the claimant’s reconsideration submissions were 24 pages single spaced and made sweeping accusations that the adjudicator denied her procedural fairness, acted as an advocate for the insurer, and was biased towards her. Adjudicator Boyce was critical of the fact that the claimant made allegations in her written submissions about what happened during the 1-day in-person hearing without providing a transcript of the hearing to support her arguments. The claimant argued she was denied procedural justice to cross-examine the investigator however Adjudicator Boyce noted that the claimant did not provide any evidence that she summonsed the investigator who conducted the surveillance. Ultimately, Adjudicator Boyce dismissed all of the claimant’s grounds for reconsideration.

Escobar v. The Guarantee Company of North America (20-000259)

The claimant sought entitlement to two treatment plans, including a medical benefit for dental treatment and a rehabilitation benefit for a hot tub. The claimant also sought a special award. Adjudicator Grant found that the claimant was entitled to the OCF-18 for dental treatment, but was not entitled to the OCF-18 for a hot tub, as the expense was incurred prior to the submission of the treatment plan, contrary to s. 38(2) of the Schedule. With respect to a special award, neither party made submissions. Adjudicator Grant therefore found that an award was not appropriate in the circumstances. It was not unreasonable for the insurer to rely on the reports of its assessors when denying the OCF-18 for dental treatment.

Corpuz v. Aviva General Insurance (19-014198)

The claimant applied to the LAT seeking entitlement to medical benefits proposed in two treatment plans. The insurer sought an award of costs in the amount of $1,000.00 on the grounds that the claimant acted vexatiously and in bad faith in the proceeding. The insurer argued that the claimant had misled the LAT by misrepresenting the procedural history for a psychological assessment. Vice Chair McGee found that the claimant failed to demonstrate that the treatment plans in dispute were reasonable and necessary. Vice Chair McGee found that the claimant’s submissions regarding the procedural history for the psychological assessment were inaccurate but not made with the deliberate intent to mislead and deceive the LAT. That said, Vice Chair McGee found that the claimant’s conduct in the proceeding did rise to the threshold of vexatious and bad faith conduct warranting a costs award of $100.00.

Campbell v. Aviva Insurance Company (19-012095)

The claimant sought entitlement to three treatment plans for chiropractic treatment. Adjudicator Lake found that the claimant was entitled to all three of the treatment plans, plus interest as a result of the insurer’s failure to comply with section 38(8). The claimant cited the decision of T.F. v. Peel Mutual Insurance Company, stating that an insurer’s “”medical and other reasons”” should, at the very least, include specific details about the claimant’s condition forming the basis for the insurer’s decision or, alternatively, identify information about the claimant’s condition that the insurer does not have, but requires. Adjudicator Lake found that the insurer’s denial notices did not comply with its obligations under section 38(8) because they mentioned “”injuries,”” but did not specify which injuries or conditions formed the basis of the decision, and did not include the IE report that it relied upon in correspondence. Further, the insurer highlighted the IE report’s recommendation for an independent exercise program, but failed to address the fact that the proposed treatment plans also included, in part, an exercise program. Finally, Adjudicator Lake stated that the insurer did not sufficiently identify the information that it still required from the claimant.

Zhao v. Allstate Canada (20-000134)

The claimant filed a LAT application seeking entitlement to an attendant care assessment, various other treatment plans, and an award under Regulation 664. The claimant’s hearing submissions noted that the dispute over medical benefits other than the attendant care assessment were resolved prior to the hearing. While the case conference order referenced a claim for an award, the claimant did not address the claim for an award in the hearing submissions. The insurer requested that the claim for an award be dismissed as (1) the claimant had not provided particulars of the claim by the document disclosure deadline noted in the case conference order, (2) the claimant’s submissions were devoid of any claim for an award, (3) the claimant was barred from making further arguments relating to the award claim pursuant to Rule 9.4 of the Common Rules of Practice and Procedure, and (4) it would be breach of procedural fairness for the LAT to accept subsequent particulars from the claimant relating to the award. The claimant did not file Reply submissions. Adjudicator Parish dismissed the claim for an award because the particulars were not disclosed by the document production deadline and the claimant violated Rule 9.4. Adjudicator Parish found that it would be a breach of procedural fairness to the insurer to allow the applicant to proceed with the award without particulars being produced in advance of the hearing. Adjudicator Parish further found that the claimant was not entitled to the attendant care assessment. The insurer had previously approved attendant care based on an earlier assessment, and the claimant had not incurred any attendant care expenses. The OT in-home attendant care assessment report by Raymond Wong was not persuasive as it relied to a large extent on the claimant’s self reporting and limited objective testing. The assessment was found not to be reasonable and necessary.

Hastings v. Royal Sun Alliance insurance (20-001485)

The claimant sought entitlement to two treatment plans, including chiropractic services and physiotherapy. Adjudicator Mazerolle found that the claimant was not entitled to payment for either of the disputed treatment plans. The claimant alleged that the treatment plans were not denied within the ten-day timeline required by section 38(8) and that the insurer relied on an outdated insurer’s examination to deny the physiotherapy treatment plan, as this examination took place before the claimant was removed from the MIG. Adjudicator Mazerolle found that the insurer filed its denial letters within the ten-day window, which excluded statutory holidays. Further, although the insurer sent the denial letters to the claimant’s former legal representative, the claimant was copied and, therefore, it was considered to be proper service. With respect to the claimant’s argument that the insurer relied on an outdated examination, Adjudicator Mazerolle found that this submission was not properly understood as a challenge under section 38(8). Although the claimant might disagree with the insurer’s use of the medical report, the stated reliance is a medical reason in accordance with section 38(8)

Delagrammatikas v. Aviva General Insurance (19-013365)

The claimant sought entitlement to a treatment plan for dietician services, a treatment plan for physiotherapy, a rehabilitation benefit for rehabilitation support worker services, and interest. The claimant submitted that he gained weight after the accident which has been a barrier to his recovery. The parties disagreed as to the amount of weight the claimant gained after the accident, but it was sufficient to note that the claimant experienced additional weight gain because of accident-related inactivity and stress. Vice-Chair McGee rejected one of the IE assessors’ opinion on the basis that the report raised doubt as to the thoroughness of the assessment and found that the claimant had discharged his onus of establishing that dietician services were reasonable and necessary. The claimant further submitted that the treatment plan for rehabilitation support worker services was reasonable and necessary based on the opinion of one of the expert witnesses. However, Vice-Chair McGee determined that the claimant failed to establish how the services described in the plan aligned with the expert’s recommendations and how interpersonal relationship facilitation was linked to the exercise follow-through and help with home projects that were the proposed focus of rehabilitation support in the treatment plan. For these reasons, the proposed rehabilitation support services was deemed not reasonable or necessary. Lastly, the treatment plan for physiotherapy services was found to be reasonable and necessary as the insurer had not presented reliable evidence that the claimant’s condition would not be changed by ongoing physiotherapy treatment meanwhile the claimant presented evidence that he had experienced symptomatic relief from physiotherapy. The claimant also sought the exclusion of two of the Insurer’s Examination (IE) reports because the authors failed to complete and sign an Acknowledgment of Expert’s Duty form as required under Rule 10.2(b) of the Tribunal’s Common Rules of Practice and Procedure. The insurer submitted that the claimant was non-complaint with Rule 10.2, specifically sub-rule 10.2(a), which required a party to provide the name and contact information of an expert witness, and sub-rule 10.2(e), which required a party to provide a summary of the expert witness’s findings and conclusions. Vice-Chair McGee concluded that the reports of the expert witnesses complied with the requirements of Rule 10.2(a) and (e) and were admissible. On the other hand, the insurer failed to comply with Rule 10.2(b) in respect of the IE reports. However, Vice-Chair McGee was prepared to admit the reports despite the insurer’s non-compliance with the rule. Vice-Chair McGee found that the prejudice to the insurer that the exclusion of its expert evidence would cause exceeds the concern for technical compliance with the Rules. The Rules are to be liberally interpreted and applied and may be varied to facilitate a fair process.

Manoharan v. Allstate Canada (19-010782)

The claimant sought entitlement to various medical benefits, which the insurer had denied based on the MIG. At the LAT case conference, the insurer removed the claimant from the MIG and approved some of the treatment plans. At the LAT hearing, the claimant disputed entitlement to one treatment plan plus interest on the previously approved treatment plans, and claimed a special award. Adjudicator Boyce awarded interest on incurred treatment plans and found the disputed treatment plan payable. In terms of interest, Adjudicator Boyce found that it was payable when there was an overdue benefit, and that section 51 did not allow the insurer to avoid paying interest through the actions or inactions of the claimant. With respect to the disputed medical benefit for a physiatry assessment, Adjudicator Boyce found it payable as he believed it was reasonable and necessary given the claimant had not reached maximum medical recovery 1.5 years post-accident. Finally, Adjudicator Boyce granted a special award noting that the insurer had conceded that it mishandled certain aspects of its file and its submissions focused on how it tried to mitigate these “”inadvertences.”” Adjudicator Boyce criticized the insurer for delaying payments as it caused the claimant harm. Adjudicator Boyce awarded a special award in the amount of $1,500 plus 2% interest compounded monthly, representing approximately 10 percent of the disputed benefits.

Budhram v. Aviva General Insurance (19-014428)

The claimant sought entitlement to two treatment plans, including massage therapy and a chronic pain assessment. Adjudicator Lake found that the claimant was entitled to a portion of the remaining amount for the massage therapy, but was not entitled to the chronic pain assessment. The claimant submitted that the insurer failed to comply with its obligations under section 38(8). Adjudicator Lake stated that failing to provide a compliant denial notice within 10 business days after receipt of the OCF-18 does not render an entire OCF-18 payable. Based on a plain reading of section 38(11)(2), the insurer is liable for payment of the proposed treatment described in the disputed OCF-18 that relates to the period starting on the 11th business day after the day that the insurer received the OCF-18 and ending on the day the insurer gives a notice described in section 38(8). Adjudicator Lake also stated that the amount does not need to be incurred during that time. Further, Adjudicator Lake referenced T.G. v. Peel Mutual Insurance Company, when stating that the insurer did not include sufficient details regarding the claimant’s condition forming the basis for the insurer’s decision. The insurer stated that it was “”unable to determine whether the recommendations on the OCF-18 were reasonable and necessary for the injuries sustained.”” The insurer failed to provide any specific details about the claimant’s condition that formed the basis of its decision and did not, in the alternative, identify information about the claimant’s condition that the insurer did not have, but required. Finally, Adjudicator Lake concluded that medical reasons provided under a separate heading for an IE do not mitigate the requirement of the insurer to provide medical reasons for its denial of the OCF-18 under section 38(8).

N.M. v. Aviva Insurance Canada (18-008710)

The claimant was involved in two accidents. He sought entitlement to NEBs for the second accident, and sought various medical benefits for both accidents. Adjudicator Paluch held that the claimant was entitled to NEBs up to the two-year mark because the insurer failed to properly stop entitlement. The insurer had stopped payment of NEBs after receiving paper review IEs, but the claimant had never received a notice under section 44 indicating that the paper review was taking place. Adjudicator Paluch found the insurer’s breach of sections 36 and 37 resulted in the claimant’s continuing entitlement to NEBs. The claimant was also awarded two treatment plans for physiotherapy for the second accident. Two claimed assessments were dismissed because they were completed before ten business days had elapsed after submission of the treatment plans, contrary to section 38(2).