F.C. v. Aviva Insurance Canada (18-001359)

The insurer sought reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision awarding NEBs and a treatment plan for failure to comply with sections 36 and 38, respectively. Adjudicator Boyce dismissed the reconsideration. He held that Stranges v Allstate was not good law in relation to the current version of the SABS, which required payment of NEBs until a proper denial is given to the claimant. He also rejected that the Tribunal should apply section 7 of the LAT Act in the insurer’s favour to cure the lack of NEBs denial.

A.D.W. v. Aviva Insurance Company (18-012150)

The claimant sought entitlement to NEBs and one treatment plan for physiotherapy. Adjudicator Watt dismissed both claims. The claimant did not provide evidence of the comparison of his pre-accident and post-accident life. Further, the claimant admitted to doctors that he was independent with personal care, gardening, cooking, and yard work. With regard to physical treatment, Adjudicator Watt held that there was no evidence of the need for further facility based treatment.

M.R. v. Aviva General Insurance Company (18-006946)

The claimant sought payment of treatment plans seeking chiropractic treatment and a chronic pain program. The claimant argued that some of the denials were non-compliant with section 38 of the SABS. The insurer argued that some of the treatment plans were denied more than two years after the denial and were time barred. Adjudicator Norris found one of the treatment plans to be barred by the limitation period as it was denied in compliance with section 38, and the claimant failed to provide reasons why section 7 of the LAT Act should extend the limitation period. A treatment plan for chiropractic therapy was denied without adequate medical reasons. It only stated that the treatment plan was identical to an earlier treatment plan which was denied by IE, but failed to set out those earlier reasons for denial. Another treatment plan for chiropractic treatment was denied but the correspondence did not indicate the MIG applied. Nevertheless, Adjudicator Norris concluded that the proposed treatment was not reasonable and necessary. Finally, a chronic pain program was denied two months after submission. The treatment plan was found not reasonable and necessary, but the insurer was required to pay for amounts incurred up to the date of denial.

C.G. v. The Guarantee Company of North America (17-007300)

The claimant had a number of pre-accident injuries and impairments. She suffered an exacerbation of her conditions in the accident. She sought entitlement to NEBs, removal from the MIG, and two assessment costs. The insurer argued that the claimant’s impairments were not caused by the accident. Adjudicator Johal accepted that the accident did cause an exacerbation of pre-existing injuries that would otherwise have not occurred. She also concluded that the claimant suffered chronic pain as a result of the accident given that her pain persisted for more than six months, and her injuries therefore did not fall within the MIG; this conclusion was made without a specific diagnosis of chronic pain. The claimed psychological assessment was awarded, but the denied in-home assessment was not as the medical evidence suggested that the claimant remained independent with personal care. The claim for NEBs was also dismissed. The claimant failed to provide evidence that her post-accident life was significantly different than her pre-accident life.

C.G. v. The Guarantee Company of North America (17-007300)

The claimant had a number of pre-accident injuries and impairments. She suffered an exacerbation of her conditions in the accident. She sought entitlement to NEBs, removal from the MIG, and two assessment costs. The insurer argued that the claimant’s impairments were not caused by the accident. Adjudicator Johal accepted that the accident did cause an exacerbation of pre-existing injuries that would otherwise have not occurred. She also concluded that the claimant suffered chronic pain as a result of the accident given that her pain persisted for more than six months, and her injuries therefore did not fall within the MIG; this conclusion was made without a specific diagnosis of chronic pain. The claimed psychological assessment was awarded, but the denied in-home assessment was not as the medical evidence suggested that the claimant remained independent with personal care. The claim for NEBs was also dismissed. The claimant failed to provide evidence that her post-accident life was significantly different than her pre-accident life.

A.S. v. Certas Home and Auto Insurance Company (19-004994)

The claimant was involved in a 2009 accident. She sought entitlement to three assessments and a series of CAT assessments. An initial issue was raised as to whether section 25 of the post-2010 SABS applied, or if section 24 of the earlier SABS applied. The adjudicator held that section 25 of the 2010 SABS applied, as the transitional rules did not keep section 24 in force. On the claimed benefits, Adjudicator Farlam concluded that none of the assessments were payable. the claimant failed to provide evidence that the subject accident caused ongoing impairment, particularly in light of a subsequent accident she was involved in. Regarding the claimed CAT assessments, the adjudicator held that there was no reasonable basis to investigate whether the claimant was catastrophically impaired, and no evidence led that the claimant might have a 55 percent WPI. It was again noted that the claimant’s complaints arose primarily after her second accident.

T.L.D. v. Aviva General Insurance Company (19-009050)

The claimant sought IRB, removal from the MIG, and various medical benefits. Adjudicator Grant held that the claimant failed to prove that the accident results in injuries preventing him from returning to his pre-accident employment in food delivery. He also concluded that the claimant’s injuries fell within the MIG. With regard to a hospital expense, the insurer argued that the claimant was required to submit it to his university insurance plan before seeking coverage under the SABS. Adjudicator Grant agreed that section 47(2) exempted the insurer from paying for the expense until the claimant had submitted it to his student plan.

A.M. v. Certas Home and Auto Insurance (19-002869)

The claimant disputed entitlement to numerous treatments plans and ACBs in the amount of $6,142.59 per month from November 29, 2018 and ongoing. The claimant was diagnosed with Parkinson’s Disease and Dementia pre-accident, as well as headaches and ear pain. The insurer argued that the benefits claimed were for the claimant’s pre-existing conditions, and that he had only sustained minor soft tissues injuries as a direct result of the subject accident, and were therefore not reasonable or necessary. Adjudicator Watt noted that a review of the pre-accident medical records showed that the claimant was suffering from all of the alleged accident-related complaints long before the subject accident, that the claimant’s own expert reports were often contradictory and lacked compelling arguments as to why the proposed treatments were reasonable and necessary as a result of the accident. further, some of the disputed benefits were available to the claimant through OHIP. The claimant’s own statement’s that he was independent with personal care, along with a lack of evidence that any proposed ACBs would be as a result of the accident, and not his pre-existing conditions, resulted in the claim for attendant care being dismissed along with the rest of the Application.

K.V. v. Aviva General Insurance Company (19-006030)

The claimant sought entitlement to one treatment plan for chiropractic services. Adjudicator Cavdar concluded that the claimant had not adduced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the proposed treatment plan was both reasonable and necessary. The decision was based on the fact that the treatment plans did not shed light on how the proposed chiropractic services would provide relief to the claimant based on the symptoms she was suffering at the time. The insurer also raised the procedural issue that the claimant’s written submissions should be struck in their entirety as they were submitted late and in breach of the Case Conference Order. The insurer further noted that the claimant submitted certain documentary evidence upon which it sought to rely more than one month after the deadline. The insurer sought an order that the claimant’s submissions be struck in their entirety or the records submitted late be struck, or if allowed to rely on the records submitted, the insurer be permitted a further right to respond. Adjudicator Cavdar found that it would not be procedurally fair to the claimant to strike the day-late submissions. Further, Adjudicator Cavdar wrote that it was not unduly prejudice to the insurer because the prejudice of striking the claimant’s day-late submissions outweighed any prejudice the insurer would be subjected to. Adjudicator Cavdar held that it would also be procedurally unfair to strike the evidence adduced by the claimant even though it was a month late and in violation of the Order. This was because the claimant provided a clear avenue to the insurer to garner sufficient additional time to review said evidence and submit its responding arguments at a date that was mutually agreeable. The claimant consented to pushing back the hearing date and the date of the insurer’s submissions, however, the insurer declined this offer and did not provide any explanation.

I.D.F. v. Aviva General Insurance Company (19-008993)

The claimant sought entitlement to four treatment plans for physiotherapy and other goods and services. The claimant submitted that he suffered from chronic back pain and required constant treatment. He argued that without treatment and medication, his condition would regress and his daily activities and function were reduced. Adjudicator Boyce found that the claimant’s reports of pain were consistent throughout the clinical file and his back-pain flare ups were documented in the records of his family physician. Further, Adjudicator Boyce agreed that the claimant’s timeline provided support for his contention that the cessation of treatment led to regression and an increase in pain. Therefore, Adjudicator Boyce found it reasonable to permit the claimant to undergo one more slate of physiotherapy and massage treatment in order to address his lingering pain. The goals of the plan were achievable and the cost was not exorbitant. Also, the claimant submitted that his previous anti-inflammatory and muscle relaxant did not provide adequate pain relief, necessitating a prescription for CBD oil. Adjudicator Boyce agreed that the medical records demonstrated that other pain-relief medicines had already been prescribed and had been shown to be ineffective. The treatment plan was clear on what was being prescribed and the report from Spark Cannabis confirmed that CBD oil was prescribed. Accordingly, Adjudicator Boyce held that the claimant was entitled to partial payment in the amount of $1,370.00 for the CBD oil treatment plan. The items listed as “assessment” and “prescription” were not reasonable and necessary expenses. The claimant was not entitled to the remaining treatment plans.