Applicant v. The Co-Operators General Insurance Company (17-006816)

The claimant sought a determination that his impairments were outside of the MIG and entitlement to one treatment plan for psychological services. This was the claimant’s second LAT application relating to MIG determination. The adjudicator in the hearing relating to the first application (Adjudicator Sewrattan) found that the claimant’s injuries were minor. When the second LAT application was filed, the respondent brought a motion to dismiss the application on the basis of res judicata. The motions adjudicator dismissed the motion on the basis that it was premature, finding that there was a possibility of new evidence being submitted for the second application that was not available at the first hearing. The second application then proceeded to a written hearing before Adjudicator Punyarthi, who held that only evidence that had become available since the release of Adjudicator Sewrattan’s decision would be considered. Adjudicator Punyarthi found that the claimant’s injuries were minor and that the proposed treatment was not payable as it was outside of the MIG limits.

Applicant v. Aviva General Insurance (17-006831)

The claimant sought a determination that her impairments were outside of the MIG and entitlement to attendant care and medical benefits proposed in six treatment plans. Pursuant to s. 56 of the SABS, Adjudicator Watt found that the claimant was statute barred from seeking attendant care benefits as the benefits were denied more than two years before the LAT application was filed. The respondent’s letter advising that there was no entitlement to attendant care benefits as the claimant’s injuries were within the MIG was found to have started the limitations period clock. Adjudicator Watt also found that there was no evidence demonstrating attendant care benefits had been incurred or were reasonable and necessary. Adjudicator Watt found that the claimant’s injuries fell with the MIG and that none of the treatment plans in dispute were payable as the MIG limits had been exhausted.

Applicant v RBC General Insurance Company (17-007471)

The claimant argued that his injuries fell outside the MIG due to a pre-existing condition that prevented him from achieving maximal recovery under the MIG and due to a psychological injury that was not mere sequelae of his soft tissue injuries. The claimant sought medical benefits for a psychological assessment and chiropractic services, as well as interest and a special award. Adjudicator Kershaw held that the claimant’s injuries fell within the MIG, and as such, he was not entitled to the medical benefits and interest sought, nor a special award. Adjudicator Kershaw held that the claimant had pre-existing, medically-documented shoulder tenosynovitis and rotator cuff tendinopathy, which continued after the accident but did not prevent maximal recovery, and that the claimant’s small partial shoulder tear was a minor injury.

Applicant v. Aviva Insurance Canada (17-007527)

The claimant sought a determination that her impairments were outside of the MIG and entitlement to medical benefits proposed in three treatment plans. Adjudicator Maleki-Yasdi found that the claimant’s psychological impairment took her outside of the MIG, based on evidence that pre-existing psychological issues were exacerbated by the accident. The claimant was found entitled to payment for physical treatment, a psychological assessment, and psychological treatment.

Applicant v. Unifund Assurance Company (17-006691)

The claimant sought a determination that his impairments were outside of the MIG and entitlement to medical benefits proposed in five treatment plans. Adjudicator Kepman found that the claimant’s injuries fell outside of the MIG and that he was entitled to payment for two treatment plans for chiropractic services as well as the cost of a functional abilities assessment and an in-home assessment. The claimant was found to be outside of the MIG based on pre-existing chronic lymphocytic leukemia that would prevent maximal medical recovery within the MIG limits.

Applicant v. Aviva Insurance Canada (17-007825)

The claimant sought removal from the MIG and payment of various medical benefits. Adjudicator Ferguson concluded that the claimant did not suffer chronic pain, and was therefore restricted to MIG-level benefits. The insurer, and the claimant accepted, that the Tribunal should refer to the AMA Guides in determining whether the claimant suffered chronic pain syndrome. The AMA Guides set out six factors, of which three had to be met for a diagnosis. Adjudicator Ferguson held that the claimant did not suffer at least three of the factors, and therefore did not suffer chronic pain syndrome. The claimant maintained a full time job; he returned to school after the accident; his relationship with his girlfriend was maintained; he continued to drive a vehicle; and he was independent with self-care, housekeeping, and domestic activities.

K.H. v Unifund Assurance Company (17-008686)

The claimant appealed Unifund’s MIG determination due to a pre-existing condition and sought medical benefits for physiotherapy. Adjudicator Ferguson held that the claimant’s pre-existing scoliosis of the upper thoracic spine did not remove her from the MIG because her condition was undetected before the accident, and the claimant provided no evidence that her condition would prevent maximal recovery within the MIG. Further, none of the IE assessors found any evidence of a pre-existing condition that would remove the claimant from the MIG, and the IE reports were not contested by the claimant. The adjudicator also held that the claimant’s evidence did not support a finding of chronic pain because her medical reports did not contain evidence regarding the severity, frequency, and duration of her pain or the functional impacts of her pain complaints.

T.S. v. Aviva General Insurance Canada (17-000835)

The claimant sought reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision that his injuries fell under the MIG. The Tribunal had concluded that the claimant suffered chronic pain, but that it was “clinically associated sequelae” of the initial “minor injury.” Executive Chair Lamoureux reversed the Tribunal’s decision. She held that the Tribunal’s finding that the claimant suffered from chronic pain was sufficient to deem his impairment more serious than a “minor injury.” She also wrote that chronic pain syndrome could not be “clinically associated sequelae” falling under the MIG. Executive Chair Lamoureux awarded four treatment plans that were initially denied by the Tribunal based on the claimant’s injuries falling within the MIG.

K.J. v Aviva General Insurance (17-006391)

The applicant sought various medical benefits and assessments and argued that his injuries fell outside the MIG. Adjudicator Hamud held that the applicant’s injuries fell within the MIG, and the applicant failed to establish that he could not achieve maximal recovery from within the MIG. The applicant sustained sprain and strains of the spine, shoulder, wrist, and ankle, and had sleep difficulties. The applicant had pre-existing chronic lower back pain. The adjudicator held that there was no compelling evidence to establish that the claimant’s pre-existing lower back pain would prevent maximal recovery within the MIG.

Applicant v RBC Insurance Company (17-005000)

The claimant argued that her injuries fell outside the MIG and sought medical benefits and the costs of examinations. Adjudicator Lake held that the claimant’s injuries fell within the MIG. The adjudicator concluded that there was insufficient documentary evidence, supporting reasons, or analysis to establish that the claimant had cervical radiculopathy. The claimant relied on a report that stated there was some suggestion of a cervical radiculopathy down the claimant’s right side. However, a Nerve Conduction Test was not conducted, which would have been strong evidence of cervical radiculopathy. Adjudicator Lake also noted that a Spurling’s Test was not conducted, which would have also been strong evidence. With regard to chronic pain, the claimant was not diagnosed with chronic pain syndrome, and could not demonstrate that her pain was ongoing or that she was experiencing any functional impairment.