The claimant was riding her bicycle with other cyclists. When she made a right turn, the wheels of her bicycle lost traction on a fluid deposit on the asphalt surface, causing her to fall and suffer injuries. The parties agreed that the issue in dispute was whether the claimant was involved in an “accident” as defined by subsection 3(1) of the SABS. The adjudicator applied the following test: (a) purpose test: did the accident result from the ordinary and well-known activities to which automobiles are put?; and (b) causation test: (i) was the use or operation of the vehicle a cause of the injuries?, and (ii) if the use or operation of the vehicle was the cause of injuries, was there an intervening act or acts that resulted in the injuries that cannot be said to be part of the “ordinary course of things?”. In other words, was the use or operation of the vehicle a “direct cause” of the claimant’s injuries? The adjudicator found on a balance of probabilities, that the available evidence collectively pointed to a reasonable inference that the oily stain was more than likely not left by an automobile. The adjudicator found on the balance of probabilities that the deposits of fluids from a moving vehicle onto the roadway fell within the ordinary and well-known activities to which automobiles were put. This would be the case whether fluid issued from an internal component of the vehicle that was leaking or from a faulty or improperly secured contained transported by that vehicle. Whether the substance leaked from a faulty engine or a compromised container, there was no intervening act or event that would break the causal link between the spillage and the claimant’s resulting impairment. But for the presence of the substance on the road, on the balance of probabilities deposited from an automobile, the claimant in the present case would not have suffered injuries. There was no evidence of any intervening event between the fluid being deposited and the dominant feature of the event: specifically, the claimant’s slip on the compromised surface. As a result, the adjudicator found the applicant had met her evidentiary onus to demonstrate that she was involved in an “accident” as defined by subsection 3(1) of the SABS.
