The claimant applied to the LAT in relation to NEBs, which had been denied on January 28, 2016. In January 2019 the claimant submitted an OCF-19 for a catastrophic impairment designation. The IEs agreed with the OCF-19 and the claimant was granted a catastrophic impairment. The LAT application was made in December 2019 for NEBs. The insurer argued that the claim was time barred. Adjudicator Boyce held that the limitation period did not apply. He relied on the Court of Appeal’s reasons in Tomec, reasoning that the claimant’s subsequent deterioration meant that she could not discover her claim for NEBs until years after the accident. Adjudicator Boyce also held that he would have extended the limitation period pursuant to section 7 of the LAT Act. The claimant had a bona fide intention to appeal the NEB denial in 2016, but then decided not to pursue the dispute as she was improving at the time. There was merit to the claim, based on the claimant’s psychological status. There was no prejudice to the insurer as it continued to assess the claimant for other benefits, and the IEs completed for the catastrophic impairment application provided a thorough comparison of her life activities and circumstances.
Category: Limitation Period
The claimant sought entitlement to NEBs. The insurer argued that the dispute was time barred. Adjudicator Farlam held that the denial of NEBs was clear an unequivocal, and that it was delivered to both the claimant and the claimant’s legal representative. The LAT application was made more than three months after the expiry of the limitation period. Adjudicator Farlam held that the section 7 of the LAT Act should not be used to extend the limitation period. The claimant did not show a bona fide intention to apply to the LAT within the two years after denial. The claimant also failed to show that the NEBs claim had merit, relying only upon an OCF-3 that noted NEBs entitlement.
The claimant sought entitlement to IRBs, housekeeping expenses, and various medical benefits. The insurer argued that the application was barred by the limitation period. Vice Chair McGee held that the insurer’s denials were clear and unequivocal, regardless of whether they were correct to deny the benefits. With regard to section 7 of the LAT Act, Vice Chair McGee held that she did not have the authority to extend the limitation period. She also noted that some of the disputed benefits were applied for almost 10 years after the initial denials.
The claimant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision that her claim for NEBs and medical benefits was barred by the limitation period. She argued that the Tribunal should have applied Tomec v. Economical to conclude that the claimant could not have discovered her claim until receiving an MRI result. Adjudicator Johal dismissed the reconsideration. He held that there was no error with respect to the doctrine of discoverability. The MRI report had no bearing on the claimant being aware of her need for treatment or her activities of normal life. He also noted that the insurer had not “pre-emptively denied” the claim for NEBs or physiotherapy as had occurred in Tomec.
The claimant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision that her claim for NEBs and medical benefits was barred by the limitation period. She argued that the Tribunal should have applied Tomec v. Economical to conclude that the claimant could not have discovered her claim until receiving an MRI result. Adjudicator Johal dismissed the reconsideration. He held that there was no error with respect to the doctrine of discoverability. The MRI report had no bearing on the claimant being aware of her need for treatment or her activities of normal life. He also noted that the insurer had not “pre-emptively denied” the claim for NEBs or physiotherapy as had occurred in Tomec.
The claimant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision that her claim for NEBs and medical benefits was barred by the limitation period. She argued that the Tribunal should have applied Tomec v. Economical to conclude that the claimant could not have discovered her claim until receiving an MRI result. Adjudicator Johal dismissed the reconsideration. He held that there was no error with respect to the doctrine of discoverability. The MRI report had no bearing on the claimant being aware of her need for treatment or her activities of normal life. He also noted that the insurer had not “pre-emptively denied” the claim for NEBs or physiotherapy as had occurred in Tomec.
The claimant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision that her claim for NEBs and medical benefits was barred by the limitation period. She argued that the Tribunal should have applied Tomec v. Economical to conclude that the claimant could not have discovered her claim until receiving an MRI result. Adjudicator Johal dismissed the reconsideration. He held that there was no error with respect to the doctrine of discoverability. The MRI report had no bearing on the claimant being aware of her need for treatment or her activities of normal life. He also noted that the insurer had not “pre-emptively denied” the claim for NEBs or physiotherapy as had occurred in Tomec.
The claimant was involved in multiple accidents between 1991 and 2003. A preliminary hearing was held in relation to benefits claimed following a September 1996 accident and whether certain disputed benefits were captured by various releases signed by the claimant. The claimant sought entitlement to ACBs, HK expenses, transportation expenses, and home modifications. In addition to the settlement issue, the insurer argued that the claimant was time-barred from pursuing the home modifications. Adjudicator Kowal held that the releases signed by the claimant covered all ACBs and HK expenses, and all transportation expenses up to 2016. The home modification was not captured by the release because it was considered a rehabilitation benefit, which was not covered by any of the releases. The limitation period did not apply to the claim for home modification. The insurer denied one submission for home modification in 2010, but the denial was unclear as the insurer included a list of things it would pay for, but did not state which modifications were denied. Further, the claimant submitted a new proposal for home modification in October 2017, which was considered a new application for the benefit. The insurer initially agreed to pay for the entire treatment plan, and then retracted the approval. While the insurer’s response was not clear and unequivocal, the claimant applied to the LAT less than two years after submission of the treatment plan, so the limitation period did not apply regardless.
A minor claimant applied to the LAT disputing entitlement to medical benefits and the cost of an examination. The insurer argued that the claimant was statute-barred, as the claimant filed her LAT dispute more than 2 years after the denials of benefits. The claimant argued that as she was a minor, she was not statute-barred because she filed the LAT application within two years of turning 18 years old. The insurer argued that the claimant had a litigation guardian to protect her interests and therefore, the claimant did not have a reasonable excuse for the late application and her dispute was outside the limitation period. Adjudicator Johal agreed with the insurer. Adjudicator Johal found that this was not a case to override the requirements of the Litigation Act and that the claimant had not satisfied that she had a bona fide intention to apply to the LAT within the appeal period and that she did not prove that there was a reasonable explanation for the delay. Adjudicator Johal also agreed that the insurer was prejudiced due to the uncertainty and delay over the adjudication of benefits.
The claimant sought reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision that she was statute-barred from proceeding with her application for NEBs because she did not appeal within the two-year limitation period. The claimant submitted her Reconsideration Request two days after the limitation period had expired, relying on the state of emergency arising out of the COVID-19 pandemic, and requested an extension of time. Adjudicator Grant denied the claimant’s request, noting that the claimant had not submitted any kind of evidence that the pandemic had in any way caused or contributed to the delay. Adjudicator Grant also found that, in any event, the claimant’s request for reconsideration was without merit. The Tribunal considered the evidence of submissions of the parties, and right found that the claimant’s applicable regarding NEBs was beyond the limitation period.