The claimant sought entitlement to a chronic pain assessment, and argued that the insurer’s denial did not comply with section 38(8). Adjudicator Lake agreed that the insurer’s denial did not comply with section 38(8), as none of the denials included any specific details about the claimant’s condition forming the basis of the insurer’s decision and only generally referred to the claimant’s injuries without any details or explanation. There was also no medical reason for the denial. The final denial contained a number of grammatical errors that made it unclear to an unsophisticated person, nor did it stated that the proposed assessment was not reasonable and necessary. The special award claim was dismissed. The adjudicator held that the failure to comply with section 38(8) did not meet the burden for a special award. The insurer simply misapplied the SABS.
Category: Medical Benefits
The claimant applied to the LAT disputing the quantum of IRBs he was entitled to. He also claimed the denied portions of two psychological treatment plans. The claimant was self-employed prior to the accident as a renovation contractor. He elected to use the 52 weeks of earnings prior to the accident rather than the last completed taxation year. Adjudicator Farlam accepted the accounting report of the insurer as it was based on the documentation provided by the claimant. The claimant’s own accountant used various assumptions and oral evidence from the claimant that was not supported by financial documentation. For example, the claimant did not provide purchase orders, invoices, sales summary, or time records. Adjudicator Farlam also denied the disputed portions of the psychological treatment plans. She accepted that the insurer’s decision to allow $99.75 per hour for psychotherapy was appropriate (rather than the $224.42 per hour claimed). She also held that the claimant failed to prove why “documentation support activity” was reasonable and necessary. The special award claim was also dismissed. The insurer’s delay in payment of IRBs was due to the claimant’s failure to provide financial documentation.
The claimant sought entitlement to post-104 week IRBs, physiotherapy, and a special award. Adjudicator Mather granted the claim for ongoing IRBs, but dismissed the claim for further physical therapy. She also granted a special award of 50 percent on IRBs. The claimant was a self-employed taxi driver for over a decade prior to the accident. He suffered a concussion in the subject accident which led to psychological impairments. He was also in a second accident and made a claim for accident benefits with the same insurer. The insurer denied IRBs based on IEs completed with regard to the subject accident (which concluded he did not have a psychological disorder) despite having IEs from the second accident in which the claimant was diagnosed with major depressive disorder, general anxiety, panic attacks, and vehicular phobia. The psychological IE in the subject accident ignored various relevant factors and cherry-picked evidence that was supportive of denying IRBs (such as the claimant attempting a return to work for a few hours per day). Given the claimant’s lack of other relevant job experience and poor English skills, there were no other potential types of employment that were suitable for him. Adjudicator Mather found the insurer’s denial of IRBs to be unacceptable. She held that the insurer failed in its adjusting of the claim by ignoring the psychological diagnoses in its own IEs related to the second accident. She also noted that the insurer continued to approve psychotherapy while taking the position the claimant did not have a psychological impairment preventing him from working. The claimed physiotherapy was dismissed as the claimant did not provide evidence of the need for further physical therapy. He also failed to provide evidence of treatment received to date or the progress that physical treatment provided.
The claimant sought entitlement to an in-home assessment and a special award. The insurer had an occupational therapy IE to address the proposed assessment. The questions posed to the occupational therapist were suggestive of the answers the Fund wished to receive. The occupational therapist assessed the claimant’s abilities, but was unable to diagnose the cause of his impairments. The Fund then sought an orthopedic IE, which was then changed to a physiatry IE. The claimant did not attend the IE and argued that the insurer could not request the further IE, and should have made the request at the same time as the occupational therapy IE. Vice Chair McGee awarded the proposed in-home assessment, finding that the medical records from the claimant’s family physician made clear that the assessment was reasonable and necessary. She held that the Fund’s request for the physiatry IE was not reasonable. The Fund should have known from the outset that an occupational therapist could not diagnose the cause of the claimant’s impairments. She also held that the Fund had tried to have the occupational therapist opine on matters it knew were outside of her expertise. Vice Chair McGee granted a special award of 40 percent against the Fund. She found the Fund’s decision to maintain the denial of the assessment was unreasonable and that its dealings with the claimant and the requested IEs was blameworthy conduct. The claimant was an elderly man struck as a pedestrian, and more vulnerable than the average car accident victim, warranting a higher special award.
The claimant disputed his entitlement to various treatment plans. The insurer argued that the claimant and his treatment provider failed to comply with section 38(2), 49.1, and 64 of the SABS, and that none of the treatment plans were payable. Adjudicator Grant held that each of the noted provisions were mandatory and the claimant’s failure to comply led to the treatment plans not being payable. Section 38(2) required the claimant to submit the treatment plans prior to receiving the proposed treatment; he did not do so. Section 49.1 required an unlicensed provider to deliver a printed invoice to the claimant, who was required to submit the invoice to the insurer; that did not occur. Section 64 required registration with HCAI by the treatment provider and submission of OCF-21s through HCAI; the treatment provided did not follow these requirements.
The claimant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision that her claim for NEBs and medical benefits was barred by the limitation period. She argued that the Tribunal should have applied Tomec v. Economical to conclude that the claimant could not have discovered her claim until receiving an MRI result. Adjudicator Johal dismissed the reconsideration. He held that there was no error with respect to the doctrine of discoverability. The MRI report had no bearing on the claimant being aware of her need for treatment or her activities of normal life. He also noted that the insurer had not “pre-emptively denied” the claim for NEBs or physiotherapy as had occurred in Tomec.
The claimant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision that her claim for NEBs and medical benefits was barred by the limitation period. She argued that the Tribunal should have applied Tomec v. Economical to conclude that the claimant could not have discovered her claim until receiving an MRI result. Adjudicator Johal dismissed the reconsideration. He held that there was no error with respect to the doctrine of discoverability. The MRI report had no bearing on the claimant being aware of her need for treatment or her activities of normal life. He also noted that the insurer had not “pre-emptively denied” the claim for NEBs or physiotherapy as had occurred in Tomec.
The claimant sought entitlement to a chronic pain assessment. Adjudicator Goela held that the assessment was not reasonable and necessary, and not payable. Additionally, she held that the treatment plan did not comply with section 38(3) as it was not signed by the claimant or the proposed assessor, nor did assessor provide information or opinion that the assessment was reasonable and necessary. On technical grounds alone, the treatment plan would not have been payable.
The claimant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision that her claim for NEBs and medical benefits was barred by the limitation period. She argued that the Tribunal should have applied Tomec v. Economical to conclude that the claimant could not have discovered her claim until receiving an MRI result. Adjudicator Johal dismissed the reconsideration. He held that there was no error with respect to the doctrine of discoverability. The MRI report had no bearing on the claimant being aware of her need for treatment or her activities of normal life. He also noted that the insurer had not “pre-emptively denied” the claim for NEBs or physiotherapy as had occurred in Tomec.
The claimant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision that her claim for NEBs and medical benefits was barred by the limitation period. She argued that the Tribunal should have applied Tomec v. Economical to conclude that the claimant could not have discovered her claim until receiving an MRI result. Adjudicator Johal dismissed the reconsideration. He held that there was no error with respect to the doctrine of discoverability. The MRI report had no bearing on the claimant being aware of her need for treatment or her activities of normal life. He also noted that the insurer had not “pre-emptively denied” the claim for NEBs or physiotherapy as had occurred in Tomec.